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Balik Eskwela! Education data for all

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In this special feature of PCIJ’s Money Politics Online portal, check out all the data you need on:
* The number of public and private elementary and secondary schools, from 2005 to 2016;
* The number of enrollees in public and private pre-school, elementary, and secondary schools, from 1980 to 2016; and
* The net enrollment rate and cohort survival rate of male and female students in public and private elementary and secondary schools from 2010 to 2015.

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NO LESS than the highest law of the land requires the State to promote and protect the right of all citizens to affordable, accessible, and quality education.

The Philippine Constitution in Article XIV, Section 5 obliges the State to “assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.”

Net enrollment rate and cohort survival rate for male and female students, in public and private elementary and secondary schools, from 2010 to 2015.

Net enrollment rate and cohort survival rate for male and female students, in public and private elementary and secondary schools, from 2010 to 2015.

The number of children aged 6 to 12 years old who are enrolled in pre-school to primary school have consistently recorded upticks for decades now. But in time, some of them soon fall out of school.

Only more than half of Filipino children aged 12 to 16 years old are enrolled in secondary school.

Number of enrollees in pre-school, elementary, and secondary schools, public and private, from 1980 to 2016.

Number of enrollees in pre-school, elementary, and secondary schools, public and private, from 1980 to 2016.

The total cohort survival rate — the percentage of students at the beginning of the school year who make it to the final year of their elementary or secondary school levels — range from 67 to 80 percent only. This means that for every 10 children who enter Grade 1, from two to four do not finish Grade 7 or senior high school.

Indeed, the public school system remains weak at the seams. While the total number of public elementary schools in the Philippines has steadily increased, the total number of secondary schools declined in school year 2009-2010, but also recorded a rapid rise in school year 2011-2012.

Number of schools -- public and private elementary and secondary levels, from 2005 to 2016.

Number of schools — public and private elementary and secondary levels, from 2005 to 2016.

As Balik Eskwela kicks off this June, PCIJ offers you this treasure trove of information on Education sourced from official documents and data files, some of them dating back to 1980.

Check out PCIJ’s Money Politics Online, a citizen’s resource and research tool on governance, politics, public funds, and socio-economic issues. — PCIJ, June 2017


The drug war: Cop talk and protocols

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THEY ARE supposed to be officers of the law, their protocols strict and specific on what they can and cannot do, and how they must do things. But the Philippine National Police, the lead force in the virulent war on drugs of the Duterte administration, must live and lead by their own rules, and the laws they have sworn to respect and defend. Get to know what they mean when they say or cite some things.

1. Arrest


2. Arresting Officer


3. Buy-Bust Operation


4. Case-build up


5. Case Operation Plan


6. Chain of Custody


7. Chemical Warehouse


9. Clandestine Laboratory


10. Classified Information


11. Confidential Informant


12. Confirmatory Test


13. CEPCs


14. Den, Dive, or Resort


15. Digital Evidence


16. Drug Evidence


17. Drug Dependence


18. Inflagrante Delicto


19. Ground Commander


20. High-Profile Targets


21. Intelligence


22. Interview


23. Investigation


24. Planned Operation


25. Poseur-buyer


26. Pusher


27. Search


28. Search Warrant


29. Sell


30. Surveillance


31. Use of Force

Decoding Duterte’s drug war: What the terms mean in law

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THE LAWS and official documents abound with terms and concepts that are sometimes easy and clear, but often vague and difficult, to fathom. But it is by their letter and intent that the virulent war on drugs of the Duterte administration must be implemented by the authorities, and must be understood by the citizens.

Let us unpack those that are most often repeated in the unyielding discourse on the drug war:

1. Drug User


2. Drug Pusher


4. High-Value Target


3. High-Profile Target


7. Arrest


8. Arrested


6. Neutralization


9. Surrenderer


10. Deaths Under Investigation


27. Breach of Internal Discipline


29. Personnel Involved in Illegal Drugs


12. Case Cleared


11. Investigation Concluded


28. Drug Rehabilitation


26. In-Patient Center


25. Outpatient Center


15. Crime Rate


14. Crime Volume


16. Average Monthly Crime Rate


18. Crime Solution Efficiency


17. Crime Clearance Efficiency


24. Drug-Affected Barangay


21. Slightly Affected


20. Moderately Affected


19. Seriously Affected


22. Drug-Unaffected Barangay


23. Drug-Cleared Barangay


Drug-Cleared Barangay (1)

#RealNumbersPH unreal, inexact, locked in riddles

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#RealNumbersPH Composite Data, 30 may 2017

IT HAS been branded to be the true, the good, if not so beautiful, official report on the war on drugs of the Duterte administration over the last 11 months.

Launched last May 2, #RealNumbersPH is now the government’s unitary report on the virulent drug war of the Inter-Agency Committee on Illegal Drugs or ICAD, which was created only last March as a task force with representatives from 20 law-enforcement and other state agencies.

Every Friday since, the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and other ICAD agencies have been obliged to submit updated reports to the Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO) and the Office of the President (OP). These are then consolidated into #RealNumbersPH, which in turn is transformed into social cards that run weekly on Mondays in the government-run Philippine News Agency, and on the social media pages of the PCOO and ICAD agencies.

Five editions of #RealNumbersPH have been released so far — on May 2, May 9, May 15, May 23, and May 30, 2017, with varying datasets featured.

By all indications, from a largely police operation in its first 10 months, the war on drugs has turned also into a PR and publicity operation for the Duterte administration.

Last month, in fact, representatives of the ICAD agencies were called to a communication-planning workshop organized by the OP and PCOO.

But PCIJ’s review of the data enrolled in #RealNumbersPH against official source documents of the PNP, PDEA, Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), and Department of Health, among other ICAD agencies, unmasks #RealNumbersPH to be real, correct, and true only mostly by name.

In particular, the first, fourth and fifth editions of #RealNumbersPH are writ in riddles and feature flawed and inflated numbers that are wildly different from what the primary drug-war data source, the PNP, had reported on the same dates or for the same covered periods.

Too, some of the numbers enrolled in #RealNumbersPH paint a picture so incredibly bloody, or simply incredible.

#RealNumbersPH, Homicide Cases, 30 May 2017

It reported that in 11 months from July 1, 2016 to May 30, 2017, homicide cases in the country had 12,426 — or 1,129 a month or 37 cases a day. It also says that this total includes 2,091 drug-related cases; 2,447 not drug-related; and 7,888 cases with motive not yet determined.

The figure is fantastic in itself because according to the PNP’s Crime QuickLook Crime Envrironment Report, the annual total homicide cases in the country has been far less than that in the last few years: 7,007 in 2013; 3,349 in 2014; 2,835 in 2015; and 2,338 in 2016.

#RealNumbersPH’s tally of homicide cases in the last 11 months is even higher by almost 70 percent than the sum of homicide cases recorded by the PNP from 2014 to 2016, which was 8,552.

Philippine National Police Report: Quick Look Crime Environment 2013 to 2016

Philippine National Police Report: Quick Look Crime Environment 2013 to 2016

Yet, of course, #RealNumbersPH’s number for homicide cases crossed the second half of 2016 (July to December) and the first five months of 2017 (January to May).

Still, since the total homicide cases recorded in 2016 was only 2,338, it would appear that the balance of 10,088 homicide cases in #RealNumbersPH’s latest report must have occurred only from Jan. 1 to May 30, 2017 — an average of 2,017 cases monthly, or 67 cases daily, or nearly three cases per hour.

Killed_Riddles_Table-3

Even the PNP’s numbers on homicide and murder cases under investigation is slightly smaller than that of #RealNumbersPH, for the period from July 1, 2016 to May 26, 2017.

Report of the Philippine National Police on the "Status of Homicide Cases, from 1 July 2016 to 26 May 2017."

Report of the Philippine National Police on the “Status of Homicide Cases, from 1 July 2016 to 26 May 2017.”

More inexact numbers spill out of #RealNumbersPH’s reports, however.

For instance, in its fourth report discussed in a PNA story dated May 26, #RealNumbersPH had figures that were wildly different from what the primary drug-war data source, the PNP, had reported on the same date, or for the same covered period. According to #RealNumbersPH, from July 2016 to May 23, 2017

• 3,027 had been killed in drug operations. That would be 25 to 65 more persons killed compared with data as of the same date, May 23, 2017, from the PNP Directorate for Operations and PNP Double Barrel Secretariat;

• 59,364 anti-drug operations conducted, or 3,883 to 4,059 more operations than the data from the two PNP offices;

• 78,804 suspects arrested or 3,126 to 6,012 more suspects arrested than the data from the PNP offices; and

• 1,286,389 surrenderees, or 83,343 more surrenderees than the data from the PNP Directorate for Operations.

On the bigger number of operations launched that #RealNumbersPH reported, it must be noted that apart from PNP units, the PDEA, the National Bureau of Investigation and a composite Armed Forces unit have also been authorized to conduct anti-illegal drug operations.

However, with PDEA having only 1,786 plantilla and non-plantilla personnel, and the NBI 1,826, it would seem impossible for them to account for nearly 4,000 more operations conducted, up to 65 more persons killed, up to 6,000 more persons arrested, and over 83,000 more persons coaxed to surrender, all in a day last May 23 — that is, if #RealNumbersPH’s fourth report got its numbers right, and the PNP got its numbers wrong.

Killed_Riddles_Killed

Report of the Philippine National Police on the Accomplishments of Project Double Barrel, as of 6 pm,  23 May 2017

Report of the Philippine National Police on the Accomplishments of Project Double Barrel, as of 6 pm, 23 May 2017

As of May 9, 2017, here is another report from the PNP that PCIJ obtained:

Philippine National Police's Report on "Accomplishments of Anti-Illegal Drugs Campaign," as of 16 May 2017

Philippine National Police’s Report on “Accomplishments of Anti-Illegal Drugs Campaign,” as of 16 May 2017

Meanwhile, in its fifth report released this Sunday, June 4, #RealNumbersPH did not have a total tally of “PNP personnel allegedly positive for use of illegal drugs” from July 1, 2016 to May 30, 2017. Instead, it merely said that according to the PNP Internal Affairs Service (IAS), only 207 cases of PNP personnel allegedly positive for illegal-drug use had been investigated.

Its social card also showed that 158 cases had been “resolved” (and those involved “recommended dismissed from service), and also that 158 PNP personnel had been dismissed. It is unclear, though, whether or not the 158 involved in the “resolved” cases and those dismissed were the same individuals.

#RealNumbersPH, Positive for Illegal Drugs, 30 May 2017

But the picture gets even murkier despite #RealNumbersPH’s social-card graphics. Even though it already said that more than 100 PNP personnel had been allegedly involved in drugs, #RealNumbersPH reported that of the 280 “government workers arrested in anti-illegal drug operations” during the same period, only 23 were “uniformed personnel.”

#RealNumbersPH, Positive for Illegal Drugs Use 30 May 2017

These numbers are also mere fractions of the data obtained by PCIJ from official PNP sources:

• Asked for data on the status of the PNP’s “internal cleansing” drive that forms part of Project Double Barrel, the PNP-IAS sent PCIJ reports on the “Status of Administrative Cases” and “Recommended Penalty of Resolved Administrative Cases.” These reports showed that from July 2016 to April 2017, a total of 203 PNP personnel had been dismissed from the service, 131 suspended, 49 demoted, nine issued reprimand, 159 exonerated, and 384 cases dismissed.

Philippine National Police's Report on "Status of Motu Propio Investigation," as of April 2017

Philippine National Police’s Report on “Status of Motu Propio Investigation,” as of April 2017

• As of May 26, 2017, a total of 166 PNP personnel on the numbers of “PNP personnel involved in illegal drugs” in 2016 had been dismissed from the service, according to the PNP Directorate for Operations. They include 158 PNP personnel from regional offices and national support units, and only eight from national headquarters. Of the 166, the big clusters have ranks of PO1 (67 personnel), P03 (45), P02 (30), and SP01 (12). In addition, there are also one police superintendent, two chief inspectors, one senior inspector, two inspectors, two SPO3, one SPO2, and three non-uniformed personnel.

Philippine National Police's Report on "Personnel Who Were Involved in Illegal Drugs, CY 2016."

Philippine National Police’s Report on “Personnel Who Were Involved in Illegal Drugs, CY 2016.”

The 166 total PNP personnel “found to be involved in illegal drugs,” according to the PNP’s Directorate for Operations is easily seven times more than #RealNumbersPH’s count of 23 PNP personnel arrested in drug operations.

The difference is significant: 166 minus 23 is 143 PNP personnel involved in illegal drugs who somehow went missing in the #RealNumbersPH count. One explanation could be that #RealNumbersPH may have wanted to report a deflated tally. It is also possible that the PNP knows that many more of its personnel are involved in illegal drugs but had yet to arrest them as of May 26, 2017.

Philippine National Police's Report on "Seized Illegal Drugs, Firearms, as of  23 May 2017."

Philippine National Police’s Report on “Seized Illegal Drugs, Firearms, as of 23 May 2017.”

What seems apparent in #RealNumbersPH’s first to the fifth reports between May 2 and May 30, 2017, however, is a deceleration of the growth rate of the numbers of those arrested, killed, or had surrendered, as well as the number of PNP’s drug operations.

Interestingly, what has suddenly disappeared in the government’s latest series of reports on the drug war is the number of houses visited under Oplan Tokhang. Logged at 7,760,795 as of May 9, this dipped to 7,189,306 as of May 23, in reports of the PNP Double Barrel Secretariat and PNP Directorate for Operations. But since its birth last May 2, #RealNumbersPH has not made any references to houses visited, a number that still appears in the respective reports of these two PNP offices.

Here are other time-series numbers, and their unusual slipping and sliding values, from #RealNumbersPH:

ALLEGED DRUG USERS AND PUSHERS KILLED:
2,692, as of April 20, 2017;
2,949 as of May 9, 2017;
3,027 as of May 23, 2017 (PNA article); and
3,050 as of May 30, 2017.

PCIJ Note: In its first to fourth entries on “killed drug personalities,” as of May 23, 2017, #RealNumbersPH reported an increase of 335 cases of persons killed in four weeks, or 85 killed on average a week. In the fifth report, it showed an increase of only 23 persons killed in a week’s time.

ALLEGED DRUG USERS AND PUSHERS ARRESTED:
• 64,917 as of April 20;
• 72,812 as of May 9;
• 78,804 as of May 23; and
• 80,415 as of May 30.

PCIJ Note: In its first to fourth reports, as of May 23, 2017, #RealNumbersPH reported an increase of 13,887 persons arrested, or 3,471 on average weekly. In the fifth report, it showed an increase of only 1,611 alleged drug users arrested in a week’s time.

ALLEGED DRUG USERS AND PUSHERS WHO “SURRENDERED”:
• 1,266,966 as of April 20;
• 1,266,966 as of May 9;
• 1,286,389 as of May 23; and
• 1,288,140 as of May 30.

PCIJ Note: A document that PDEA furnished PCIJ showed that as of May 15, 2017, the total number of surrenderees was also 1,266,966, or the same number enrolled in #RealNumbersPH data in its first and second reports.

#RealNumbersPH on May 2 and May 9 listed the same number of alleged surrenderees: 1,266,966. In its fourth report, it recorded an increase of 19,423 “surrenderees” in two weeks’ time, or 9,711 weekly. In its fifth report, it recorded an increase of only 1,611 surrenderees in a week’s time.

PNP reports obtained by PCIJ also showed the numbers flipping back to ground level amid the relaunch last March of the drug war into Project Double Barrel Reloaded.

The PNP gave two figures. The PNP-Public Information Office reported that only 85,850 persons had surrendered from March 1 to April 20, while the PNP Directorate for Operations said that only 18,274 had surrendered from March 1 to May 9, 2017.

POLICE ANTI-DRUG OPERATIONS:
• 53,503 as of April 20;
• 57,554 as of May 9;
• 59,364 as of May 23; and
• 60,395 as of May 30.

PCIJ Note: Summary data that PDEA gave PCIJ showed that a total of 57,892 operations against illegal drugs had been conducted as of May 15. In its first to fourth reports, #RealNumbersPH showed an increase of 5,861 police operations conducted in the four weeks from April 20 to May 23, or an average of 1,465 new operations per week. By its fifth release of data, #RealNumbersPH said there had been only 1,031 new operations since it issued its fourth report a week prior.

— Malou Mangahas, Vino Lucero, Davinci Maru, Nancy C. Carvajal, and John Reiner Antiquerra, PCIJ, June 2017

PCIJ findings: What’s flawed, fuzzy with drug war numbers?

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July-1-to-May-23

PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. Duterte has repeatedly said that drugs are the root of society’s many ills. He also seems to see drugs everywhere and in almost anything, even in the ongoing conflict in Marawi. Yet even as his administration’s controversial war against illegal drugs continues to claim lives, it has also spawned a side battle over numbers and public-relation points.

Earlier last month, the newly created Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD) launched #RealNumbersPH, an official report that supposedly offers the true and correct numbers on the drug war — from the government’s perspective. ICAD officials lamented what they called the misreporting and exaggeration by the news media of the numbers of those who were killed, arrested, or surrendered. What the ICAD officials left out was that most of those stories were based on information provided by the Philippine National Police (PNP) and other official sources.

PCIJ. Killed-During-Drug-Operations_V5

In fact, the government’s drug war narrative so far has not only been bloody, it has also been blurry. Although government officials have not denied that lives have been lost in the anti-drug campaign, they have yet to explain its narrative that is crowded with constantly changing concepts and terms, even as it is decked in numbers inflated then deflated and later inflated again. Indeed, it is a narrative defined from a war waged mainly as a police operation, its “accomplishments” or success pegged on an ever-lengthening trail of bodies and victims, but with no certain answers for whence or how it should end, and bereft of solid baselines and firm targets.

PCIJ. Arrested_V5

Over the last 11 months, PCIJ has been monitoring, collecting, curating, and organizing data and documents on the government’s war against drugs. It has also sent dozens of request letters to the PNP, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), the Department of Health, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Department of Budget and Management, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, as well as police regional and local commands to build a database on the drug war. To clarify the numbers enrolled in #RealNumbersPH and gather even more data, PCIJ also conducted separate interviews with senior officials of the PNP, PDEA, and DDB.

Ironically, in the course of its data inquiries, PCIJ found some of the numbers enrolled in reports of #RealNumbersPH to be puzzling at best and too incredible at the very least. (See related story: #RealNumbersPH ureal, inexact, locked in riddles)

That, however, is just one of the multiplying number riddles in the government’s anti-drug campaign.

PCIJ. Surrendered_V5

By their own data and documents, and according to senior officials from the PNP, PDEA, and DDB interviewed by PCIJ, the Duterte administration’s drug war remains wrapped in weak, flabby, misleading, and not sufficiently explained and meaningful data and numbers.

The most confounding number of all is the correct estimate of the total number of alleged drug users in the country. Is it 1.8 million, according to DDB? Or is it four million, according to President Duterte and PDEA — or 4.7 million, the latest from PDEA’s new formula?

It must be stressed that the officials interviewed from all the three agencies admit that these figures are not hard, real numbers. And since they all could be correct only in the particular context in which they were derived, this means they could also be wrong when used outside of that context.

In other words, 11 months into the deployment of Oplan Tokhang and Project Double Barrel, the matter of how many total drug users must be snared or coaxed to surrender under Duterte’s drug war remains an unsettled issue.

PCIJ. Houses-Visited_V5 (1)

DDB’s 1.8-million estimate of total drug dependents was derived from a 2015 survey that divided the country into five “regional groupings”: Metro Manila, North Luzon, South Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.

The survey aimed to reasonably represent male and female Filipino population aged 10 to 69 years old. After mathematical computations, the survey concluded that the minimum required sample size per regional group would be 838, or a total of 4,190 respondents. But apparently because it had ample available survey funding, the team raised the sample size to 1,000 per regional group, bringing total sample size to 5,000. Field work for the survey was conducted from Dec. 5, 2015 to Feb. 5, 2016.

Of the 5,000 respondents, 4,694 or almost 94 percent were categorized to be “non-users” or had “never used drugs before,” including102 who were not aware of any kind of illegal drugs. Only 306 or six percent of the total respondents were “lifetime users” or had used drugs at least once in their lifetime. Of these “lifetime users,” 193 or 63 percent had “used drugs before 2015” while 113 or 34 percent were “current users” or had “used drugs within January 2015 and February 2016.” Of the 113 “current users,” 39 (35 percent) were “one-time users,” and 74 (65 percent) were “repeat users.”

DDB 2015 Survey on Drug Abuse in the Philippines

Download (PDF, 18.63MB)

For much of the ongoing drug war, the PNP has chosen to use the estimate of 1.8 million drug users as basis for calculating its success or passing rate in the government’s anti-drug campaign. A PNP document dated Jan. 10 includes an “accounting of drug personalities” portion that cites 70 percent of the 1.8 million estimate number of alleged drug users as the “passing target.” That means PNP considered coaxing the surrender of 1.26 million of the total estimated drug users as its passing rate. By the time the document came out, police tallies already had more than 1.43 million of what it called “surrenderers.” By its own reckoning thus, the PNP had already hit its minimum target at that point.

President Duterte, however, had initially quoted a 3-million figure but soon turned consistent in insisting that there are four million drug dependents in the country, with the figure allegedly coming from “intelligence reports.”

Recently, though, PDEA did him even better, saying that drug users in the Philippines now total 4.7 million. This estimate was derived using PDEA’s “formula ratio and proportion,” which is in turn pegged on the number of surrenderees as a ratio of total households visited under Oplan Tokhang, divided by total number of households in the Philippines, and with a margin of error of 20 percent (supposedly representing the proportion of drug personalities “who did not surrender”).

This is PDEA’s formula: “The number of total houses visited (under Oplan Tokhang) is to the number of surrenderers is equal to X. Based on the said statistical computation, with a margin of error of 20% – those who did not cooperate with the law enforcers during the house visitation, there are 4.7 million drug users in the Philippines.”

According to PDEA, its formula makes this assumption: “For every eight households, there is one drug personality in the household.”

PCIJ. PDEA's Formula 2 v2

PCIJ. PDEA's Formula Entries

Thus, based on data derived from police intelligence and operations reports, PDEA asserts that as of May 18, 2017, “the real number of drug users in the Philippines is 4.7 million.”

Then again, a “house” is not exactly a “household” — a difference that PDEA’s formula ignores. A household represents both the house and its dwellers — “a social unit consisting of a person living alone or a group of persons who sleep in the same housing unit and have a common arrangement in the preparation and consumption of food,” according to the Philippine Statistics Authority. In contrast, a “house” refers only to the physical dwelling

PCIJ. PDEA's Formula 1

Yet a lot more numbers that government uses and #RealNumbersPH reports to define the drug war remain flawed and flabby on two levels: their accuracy in terms of facts and context, and their policy implications.

On the level of facts and context:

Some numbers need further validation from original sources. For example, PNP ground units enroll numbers by mistake or double-reporting errors, hence the slide up and down in the number of those killed and arrested between December 2016 and January 2017. The PNP says that this has happened because incident reports are instantaneously sent to the PNP’s National Operations Center but that it takes a week for investigating teams and regional commanders to validate and consolidate their reports on the same incidents.

PCIJ. Changing-Concepts_V2_2

Some numbers had been clustered under categories that the police had changed arbitrarily over time, and may thus raise questions about numbers shaving or double counting. These include the shift from categories of DUIs (death under investigation, by August 2016, though already defined at this point as murder cases), to MCUI (murder cases under investigation, by January 2017), to HCUI (homicide cases under investigation, by March 2017); and from “killed” in July 2016 reports to “killed in police operations” from August 2016 to January 2017, to “died” in police operations (by March 2017). Ever-changing disaggregation of DUI, MCUI, and HCUI figures, by status, death, or incidents, have also paved the way to another level of confusion in clustering and comparing the numbers.

PCIJ. Changing-Concepts_V1_2

PCIJ. 1.2-Killed-vs-DUI

PCIJ. 1.2 Killed-vs-DUI (5)

The rehabilitation and reintegration of an estimated 1.3 million “surrenderees” (as of May 2017) remain the biggest gaps in the services that ICAD must address. DDB says that by World Health Organization standards, only one percent of the total estimated drug users in a country may require inpatient care. The police’s punitive operations, however, do not make this distinction among those who had surrendered, or even between active and non-active drug users. Too, there is as yet no clear and systematic coordination among the PNP, DOH, and local government units and barangays on directing surrenderees to available rehab and treatment services.

Some numbers were not disaggregated by meaningful categories. Of those who had “surrendered,” for instance, how many are active, and how many are non-active drug users; how many would need inpatient rehabilitation, and how many, only outpatient care? These details, PNP admitted, were not secured during the profiling of the surrenderees in the first nine months of the drug war, hence the need for “revisitation.” In both public and private facilities, the patients would need to shoulder significant costs, according to the DDB. In public facilities, the cost of care for non-indigents could run from P5,000 to P11,000 a month, and in private facilities, from P25,000 to P200,000 a month. The government has plans but no certain assurance that it can offer financial subsidy to cover the cost of rehabilitation for indigent patients.

PCIJ. Rehab-Facility_Public-Private_Number

PCIJ. Rehab-Facility_Public-Private_Bed Capacity

Some numbers are either misleading or incorrect (i.e. number of drug rehabilitation facilities and actual bed capacity). #RealNumbersPH says that 10,500 of those who had surrendered had been “rehabilitated” in 48 drug rehabilitation facilities in the country. According to DDB data, which included non-accredited rehabs, there are now 21 public rehabilitation facilities, and 33 private rehabilitation facilities, or 54 in all. Their combined total bed capacity, however, is only 3,529 — 1,850 in the public facilities, and 1,679 in private facilities. There is thus a yawning gap between the fact that there are only 54 rehabilitation facilities for over 1.3 million alleged drug users and pushers who had surrendered, as of May 23, 2017.

PCIJ. Rehab-Facility_Public-Regions

Some numbers have no direct causal relationship (i.e. number of “surrenderees” vis-a-vis number of households visited) but these have been used by no less than PDEA to come up with its estimated total number of drug dependents in the country. In truth, the PNP says that a big proportion of surrenderees showed up at village assemblies and had not been visited at their homes, even as some homes visited in posh villages did not yield surrenderees.

PCIJ. Surrendered_V5

PCIJ. 4.1-Per-Region_Surrendered_Users_Pushers, As-of-Jan 2017

Some numbers had been separated arbitrarily by the police, or without clear basis disclosed to the public (i.e. number of those killed in “death under investigation” or murder or homicide cases, vis-a-vis number of those killed in police operations).

PCIJ.2.1-Per-Region_DUI_As-of-January-31-2017

PCIJ.1-Per-Region_Killed_As-of-Jan 2017

Some numbers had been computed against old reference values but this was not disclosed by #RealNumbersPH, among them the value of shabu seized, using the pre-Tokhang reference rate of P5,000 to P7,000 per gram. These prices also apply only to high-grade shabu, but the bulk of drugs seized from surrenderees are reportedly low-grade shabu in sachets.

PCIJ. PNP-Numbers-on-the-Drug-War_1

The PNP-Public Information Office recently stopped providing regional breakdown of drug war data as it “may compromise the effectiveness of the conducted activities.” This raises questions on transparency. While the police has proclaimed it wants to give a clearer picture of the drug war, in practice it has turned more opaque about data that could assist more and better reporting on the drug war.

PCIJ.3-Per-Region_Arrested_As-of-Jan 2017

KIPO-WIPO

PNP-Numbers-on-the-Drug-War_2

PNP-Numbers-on-the-Drug-War_1

PNP-Numbers-on-the-Drug-War_3

On the level of policy implications:

Except for Central Luzon, there are more DUI cases than the numbers of those killed in anti-drug operations of the police across the nation. This implies that vigilante and unnamed armed groups may have netted a far bigger number of casualties among alleged drug users and pushers — a sad commentary on the effectiveness and impact of Project Double Barrel. But just a fraction of so-called DUI incidents has triggered the filing of cases in court. And in a majority of these cases, the suspects remain at large.

PCIJ. 1.2-Killed-vs-DUI -Regions, as of Jan 2017

PCIJ. DUI-Filed-in-Court-Incidents_As-of-January-31-Data

PCIJ. DUI-Filed-in-Court-Incidents-Regions

Given that there are more DUI incidents than the numbers of those killed in police operations, the PNP’s Scene-of-Crime Operations (SOCO) unit has only 680 personnel, and the PNP’s Internal Affairs Service, only 664 personnel nationwide, as of August 2016. These small numbers of SOCO and IAS personnel (that include those not assigned to investigation) would be hard put running after the rising numbers of DUI and internal-cleansing cases, let alone clear their backlogs even before Double Barrel came into force.

PCIJ PNP IAS Table-2

KIPO-WIPO

A total of 4,654 firearms and 382 explosives had reportedly been seized by the PNP from a total of 55,481 anti-drug operations, as of May 26, 2017. The prevalence of loose firearms in the areas visited by Project Double Barrel raises concern about possible evidence recycling and how much firearms and explosive yet to be confiscated or recovered by the police.

6-Confiscation-of-Illegal-Drugs

• The numbers of children (26,415, as of Jan. 31, 2017) and women (39,518, as of Jan. 31, 2017) who had “surrendered” continue to rise but there are no sufficient services for them that had been lined up. Across the nation, no government rehab center has a specific rehabilitation program for women and children enrollees; child surrenderees are often referred to government social workers or even mixed with adults in already severely congested rehabilitation facilities and detention centers. DDB reported early efforts of community-based treatment focused on women, but the program is far from being fully rolled out in the whole country.

PCIJ. Child-Surrenderees-as of Jan 2017

PCIJ. Women-Surrenderees_as of Jan 2017

It seems unusual that the regions registering high numbers of child “surrenderees” (Top 5: Central Visayas, 4,841 children; Northern Mindanao, 4,676; Zamboanga Peninsula, 2,514; Davao Region, 2,266; and Caraga, 2001) did not match the Top 5 regions with the highest numbers of those killed, arrested, and had surrendered under Oplan Tokhang/Project Double Barrel. By the government’s composite data on those killed in police operations and DUI incidents, the following regions land on the top 5: Metro Manila, Calabarzon, Central Luzon, Central Visayas, and Northern Mindanao.

PCIJ. 6.1-Barangay-Affectation_Numbers_Before-July-2016

7-Barangay-Affectation_Percentage_Prior-July-2016_V5

How many barangays tagged to be “affected” by drugs had been “cleared” under Tokhang/Project Double Barrel in the last 11 months? There are no specific tracking data for this, except for reports by DDB and PDEA on the numbers of “drug-affected barangays” before July 2016, compared with those as of April 2017. It is unusual that the two sets of numbers show that from only 32 to 36 percent of total barangays classified to be “drug-affected” in July 2016, the figure has grown to 48 percent, out of the total barangays in the country, by April 2017.

8-Barangay-Affectation_Numbers_As-of-April-2017_1_V5.5

PCIJ. Barangay-Affectation_Percentage_As-of-April-2017_V5 (4)

8-Barangay-Affectation_Numbers_As-of-April-2017_2_V5.5

10-Barangay-Affectation_July-2016-vs-April-2017_1_V5.5

10-Barangay-Affectation_July-2016-vs-April-2017_2_V5.5

The data on “drug-affected barangays” before July 2016 show that the Top 10 regions with the biggest percentage of “drug affectation” are, in order of magnitude, Calabarzon, Metro Manila, Central Luzon, Ilocos Region, Eastern Visayas, Negros Island Region, Western Visayas, Cagayan Valley, Bicol Region, and Caraga. By the numbers of those killed in both police operations and DUI incidents, as of January 2017, the Top 5 regions are Metro Manila, Calabarzon, Central Luzon, Central Visayas, and Northern Mindanao. The Ilocos Region and Eastern Visayas have registered only smaller numbers.

PCIJ. Killed-vs-DUI Cases, as of Jan 2017

PCIJ. DUIs with Cases Filed in Court, as of Jan 2017

PCIJ.1-Per-Region_Killed_As-of-Jan 2017

PCIJ.3-Per-Region_Arrested_As-of-Jan 2017

By April 2017, the Top 10 regions, by number of drug-affected barangays follow in order of magnitude are: Ilocos Region, Calabarzon, Central Visayas, Central Luzon, Metro Manila, Cagayan Valley, Caraga, Western Visayas, Mimaropa, and Eastern Visayas. By the numbers of those killed in both police operations and DUI incidents, the Ilocos Region, Central Visayas, and Cagayan Valley have registered smaller numbers.

8-Barangay-Affectation_Numbers_As-of-April-2017_V1_2

PCIJ. 4.2-Per-Region_Surrendered_As-of-Jan 2017

PCIJ. 5-Per-Region_Houses-Visited_As-of-Jan 2017

“Internal cleansing” of police personnel involved in the illegal drugs trade remains a belated, if also hazy, matter in the PNP, in terms of data disclosed to the public. A report received by PCIJ recently from PNP’s Double Barrel Secretariat showed that for 2016, only 166 PNP officers and men — out of the 145,0000-strong PNP — had been established to be “involved in illegal drugs.” The 166 include 158 PNP personnel from regional offices and national support units, and only eight from national headquarters. Of the 166 total, the big clusters have ranks of PO1 (67 personnel), P03 (45), P02 (30), and SP01 (12). In addition, there are also one police superintendent, two chief inspectors, one senior inspector, two inspectors, two SPO3, one SPO2, and three non-uniformed personnel.

PNP-Personnel-Involved-in-Illegal-Drugs_1

PNP-Personnel-Involved-in-Illegal-Drugs_2

A related matter is what the PNP calls its “motu propio investigation” of a total of 331 cases under “remaining investigation,” apart from 294 cases “terminated at IID (Investigation and Inspection Division) level, and 119 cases “for pre-charge investigation.” It is not clear though if the PNP’s numbers also refer to the number of respondents in the cases.

PCIJ. Recommended-Penalty-of-Resolved-Administrative-Cases

PCIJ. Status-of-Administrative-Cases

— Malou Mangahas, Vino Lucero, Davinci Maru, and John Reiner Antiquerra, PCIJ, June 2017

Innocent until proven guilty, yes! Guilty until proven innocent, no!

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BY LAW, only certain acts or actions are clear grounds for any citizen to be investigated, arrested, or compelled to surrender, despite the vigorous push by the Duterte administration to crack down on illegal drugs use and abuse.

In free and democratic societies, the time-honored principle of due process upholds a person’s innocence, until he or she is proven guilty in a court of law. The principle cannot and should not be flipped into a person seemingly presumed to be guilty, until he or she is proven innocent by the police.

Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Of 2002 imposes stiff penalties — fat fines and life in jail — on violators, after due trial. But nowhere is it written in the law that death is the most tragic fate that should befall alleged drug users and pushers.

WHAT CITIZENS SHOULD KNOW:

PCIJ. Unlawful Acts. Title Logo


PCIJ. Use of dangerous drugs


PCIJ. Possession of Dangerous Drugs


PCIJ. Drugs in Parties


PCIJ. Possession of Paraphernalia


PCIJ. Sale, trade of drugs


PCIJ. Manufacture


PCIJ. Manufacture, delivery of drugs


PCIJ. Importation


PCIJ. Drug Precursors


PCIJ. Den, dive, Resort


PCIJ. Den, dive, resort employees


PCIJ. Cultivation


PCIJ. Unnecessary drug prescription


PCIJ. Unlawful drug prescription


PCIJ. Penalty for aliens

WHAT LAW ENFORCERS, AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES SHOULD KNOW:

PCIJ. Planting evidence


PCIJ. Liability of public officials


PCIJ. Misappropriation of records


PCIJ. Liability as Witnesses


PCIJ. Delay, Bungling of Cases

PCIJ asks PNP, PDEA, DDB: Why inflate, deflate, reboot numbers?

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IN A SERIES recently, PCIJ conducted separate, extended interviews with senior officials of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Philippine National Police (PNP), and the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB).

Our goal: Get their side on specific questions about the numbers, conduct, impact, and confusing concepts and narratives of President Rodrigo R. Duterte’s war on drugs.

The on-cam interviews that lasted about six hours in all — or two hours for each interviewee — also focused on gaps in the data on the drug war that PCIJ has gathered over the last 11 months, through dozens of request letters filed with these and other state agencies. PCIJ’s files now host over 2.7 gigabytes of data on the drug menace and the drug war, with data as early as 2010 and as current as May 2017.

PCIJ commended the three agencies for finally fielding a unitary report (#RealNumbersPH) on the status of the drug war, but also raised clarificatory questions on sundry issues that the report has not settled.

Interviewed were:

Director Derrick Arnold C. Carreon, chief of the PDEA Public Information Office. (PDEA Director General Isidro Lapeña, chair Of Inter-Agency Committee On Illegal Drugs (ICAD) under Duterte’s Executive Order No. 15, was out of town and in his stead, directed Carreon to sit down with PCIJ);

Police Director Camilo Pancratius P. Cascolan, head of the PNP Directorate for Operations and the PNP Double Barrel Secretariat. (PCIJ had sought interviews with PNP chief, Director General Ronald ‘Bato’ de la Rosa and PSSupt.Dionardo B. Carlos, chief PIO of the PNP but both declined on account of busy schedules.); and

Secretary Benjamin P. Reyes, until then the chairman of the DDB. Four hours after PCIJ’s interview with Reyes on May 24, 2017, Duterte issued oral orders firing him for his statements that DDB has estimated only 1.8 million total drug dependents, or less than half the four-million figure that the President usually cites in his speeches. “You do not contradict your own government… You’re just a civilian member of a board,” Duterte has said of Reyes.

What follows are the questions and topics PCIJ discussed with the three interviewees.
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For Director Derrick Arnold C. Carreon, chief of the PDEA Public Information Office, Interview conducted on May 18, 2017, at the PDEA Compound, Diliman, Quezon City:

• In your agency’s plan,what is/are the measures of success of the drug war?
• What reporting and verification mechanisms do you have to verify raw data on the drug war?
• President Duterte organized the Inter-Agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD) through Executive Order No. 15 only on March 6, 2017. It has four clusters (enforcement, advocacy, justice, and rehabilitation and reintegration). What are the tasks and activities of each cluster?
• There are two numbers of estimated drug dependents: four million (Duterte, ICAD, PDEA) and 1.8 million (DDB’s 2015 Survey). Explain how you computed four million.
• PDEA’s formula for deriving the estimated number of drug dependents seems flawed: Why did you compute for 22 million total households in the Philippines when the government says only 48 percent or only 20,160 “drug-affected barangays ” out of the 42,000 total barangays in the country? How many households are in barangays that are not drug-affected?
• Government says the Philippine drug market is a P120-billion industry. How did PDEA get this estimate? How is this P120-billion industry estimate distributed among the different kinds of illegal drugs?
• On the numbers of those killed, arrested, surrendered, operations conducted: How does PDEA keep its figures in sync with the PNP. Do you get, validate, and confirm raw reports from PNP field units?
• On the price of shabu: How did PDEA derive the estimate of P15,000 per gram? Slide 12 of #RealNumbersPH show wrong numbers: P15,000 and up price per gram x 1,645 kilos of shabu seized amounts to P24.675 billion, and not P14.49 billion worth of shabu as the report says had been seized.What is the real amount of drugs confiscated?
• Does PDEA monitor cases of those killed during police operations? Is there any investigation mechanism in place to determine if the killlings were justified and necessary? Does PDEA monitor cases filed with the PNP IAS on these cases?
• Deaths under investigation – how should these deaths be classified?
• How does PDEA dispose of confiscated drugs? What procedures are in place to prevent the revert to the market of seized drugs?’
• How much has PDEA given out as rewards to policemen and other operatives (as mandated by DDB Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2016)? Where did these funds come from?
• What happens to those arrested – were they charged? What has happened to the surrenderees? Where and which agency keeps their surrenderees’ forms?
• What is the concept behind “barangay drug affectation”? Which regions the most affected? Do you have reports on which barangay and how many had been declared cleared?
• How should one determine the success of the drug war? What is its end goal? When will it end?

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For PDir. Camilo Pancratius Cascolan, PNP Directorate for Operations and Double Barrel Secretariat, interview conducted on May 23, 2017, at the PNP National Headquarters in Quezon City:

• How should the PNP measure the success of the drug war?
• How does the PNP derive its numbers of those killed, arrested, surrendered, houses visited, operations conducted? Who are your sources? Have you made mistakes?
• What are your baseline numbers: starting figures and latest figures? How does the PNP track its drug war accomplishments in the regions? What reporting and verification mechanisms are in place?
• The 1.2 million “surrenderees”: Does PNP have disaggregated data on how many are active drug users, and how many, inactive drug users?
• The number of surrenderees and the houses visited: Is there a direct correlation, as the PDEA formula for estimating the total number of drug users seems to suggest? How many surrenderees turned up at barangay assemblies and were not visited at their homes?
• Of the “DUI” cases: How does PNP determine who are DUI victims and who had been killed in police operations? How many DUI had triggered cases filed in court? Why so few? Why so many suspects at large? Are DUIs not a matter of failure by the PNP?
• Why has the PNP stopped reporting numbers of guns seized from drug suspects and victims of DUI cases? How many guns in all had been seized by the PNP in the last 10 months? Where are these guns? What are your findings about the sources of these guns?
• Internal cleansing: How many in the PNP are subjects of investigation? Who are they by rank and assignment? What is the process and findings of the investigation conducted?
• Ten months hence,in PNP’s assessment, what is the direction of the drug war? Slowing down?Consistently moving? How many cases had been resolved? Why are there are there more unresolved than resolved cases? Why is the PNP not disclosing results of its internal cleansing investigation?
• “Operation Lawmen” assigns rewards to PNP personnel and units for drugs seized in operations. How much had been given out as rewards for which units? How much and where is this reward money enrolled in the national budget?
• Police operations: About 53,000 anti-drug operations had been conducted as of this week. What is the process for planning an operation and getting clearance from PDEA? Do Tokhang operations often turn into instant police operations? Why are there so many buy-bust operations and shootout incidents?
• How many PNP personnel had been killed and wounded in drug operations from 10 months ago? How do these numbers compare with the numbers of those killed and wounded before Double Barrel?
• Shabu/drugs haul: What reference price should be used in your report? Low-grade and high-grade shabu found in most of those killed?
• PDEA says the average drug user consumes about 0.4 grams of shabu per day. What is the PNP’s estimate? How many drug pushers in all? What is the typical/average network of a drug pusher, by the number of users they sell to?
• How many PNP personnel had been deployed in Tokhang/Double Barrel operations? Are there “quotas” (operations conducted, numbers of arrested, surrendered, houses visited) that the PNP units must deliver? What happens to units that deliver below expectation?
• PDEA says the drug war must reduce barangay affectation levels by 30 per cent per year. Does PNP have its own accomplishment targets? Does ICAD have its own, i.e. numbers of arrested, surrendered, houses visited, rehabilitation rate, and reintegration rate?
• What are the PNP’s protocols in operations leading to violent deaths? Were SOCO teams deployed in all the cases of those killed in the drug war? Where are the reports?
• Has PNP monitored what happens to the bodies of those killed? There are reports of bodies of indigent victims left unclaimed in a number of morgues. What does PNP plan to do about this? Has PNP offered assistance to the victims’ families?
• The affidavits of the surrenderees: How are these collated by which agencies? Where are these affidavits kept? What purposes do these affidavits serve the PNP? Are these affidavits in effect reference for operations in future of the PNP? Why require surrenderees to report weekly to barangay officials who often do not know what counseling services to offer?
• Women and children arrested/surrendered about 55,000 in all, or less than five percent of 1.2 million total surrenderees. Has PNP sorted the data on surrendereees by age, income status, educational attainment, profession/job, religion, and civil status?
• The estimates of total drug dependents, total drug trade, total numbers of killed, arrested, surrendered: How does PNP derive its numbers? Until December 2016, PNP Chief de la Rosa was using 1.6 million as the PNP estimate of total drug dependents, while the President has consistently used four million? Why?
• “Barangay affectation”: What is the concept about? In July 2016, before Tokhang/Double Barrel started, reports stated there were only around 32.5 to 36 percent “drug-affected barangays” in the country. The figure by April 2017 has risen to 48 percent of the 42,000 total barangays in the Philippines. Why? Do these numbers suggest that the drug war has been a failure?
• How are barangays “cleared” of drug affectation? Can “cleared” barangays return to “affected” status? How?
• The PNP organization and Tokhang/Double Barrel: What has happened to the men, funds, and resources of the PNP-Anti-Illegal Drugs Group that General Bato dissolved after the Jee Ick Joo murder? Which agencies call the shots on what barangays should be targeted for drug operations? What clearances and other requirements (from PDEA, PNP command) must ground units secure before an operation? How long is the entire process of planning to actual conduct to documentation of a police operation against illegal drugs?
• Cases filed for those arrested in police operations: Why so few compared to the numbers of those arrested? Who are the witnesses? Prosecutors? In which courts filed?
• Cases filed for DUI cases: In which courts have these cases been filed? Who are the respondents? Why so few compared to number of DUI incidents? Why are so few suspected arrested? Who are the prosecutors/defense lawyers in these cases?
• Complaints filed by families of those killed in drug operations: Does PNP monitor? How many cases in all had been filed, and where? Who are the respondent PNP personnel and units? What is the typical case disposition rate for all these cases?
• Budget for Tokhang/Double Barrel: PCIJ has requested data from PNP Directorate for Comptrollership, which tossed our request to PNP Directorate for Operations, but you tossed back our request to the PNP Comptrollership. Why? Which agency in PNP has the answers? Why is there no transparency about this matter?
• Budget for Tokhang/Double Barrel: What are the top expense items? What are your sources of funds? Which/who are the disbursing officers? What are the rules for reporting on disbursements and requesting fund support? What are the gaps in the PNP personnel’s equipage/resources needed for Tokhang/Double Barrel?
• High-Value Targets: What has happened to the wad of alleged intelligence reports on drug coddlers among generals and local/barangay officials that President Duterte shows off in public? What has happened to the generals Duterte has linked to the drug trade early on? How many barangay officials, local officials, police officers and men are alleged coddlers of drug pushers? What does PNP plan to do about them? What is the status of your investigation into each case?
• Surrenderees data files: How big is the data cache on the 1.2-million surrenderees by now? If encoded, how big is this file by gigabytes? Who or which agencies have access to this file? Should surrenderees worry that this file is a virtual dossier on them as targeted persons in the drug war?
• Tokhang/Double Barrel subjects: Why are those killed, arrested, surrendered overwhelmingly poor and from poor communities? Why are there so few rich and prominent persons arrested? Why are there just a small number of raids conducted in posh villages, and smaller volumes of non-shabu drugs seized by the police?
• Bodies: Does the PNP have a count of the bodies of those killed left unclaimed at the morgues and funeral parlors? How does PNP propose to manage this situation?
• Census of houses: PNP and local government units have started to conduct a census of households for the drug war. What is its purpose? Who or which agencies will keep the census data?
• Drug use for medical/health reasons, or as a cultural norm: Does Tokhang/Double Barrel recognize these situations to be valid?
• The Law (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2012, Republic Act No. 9165) does not distinguish clearly between users/abusers, pushers, possession with discernment, toxicity or purity of drugs, harm-reduction or health dimensions of drug use, and drug abuse as a co-dependency social malaise among family members. Tokhang/Double Barrel has been conducted in the last 10 months as a police operation? Should the law be amended?
• Will a punitive war on drugs not only force pushers to transfer trade elsewhere or go underground?
• Trauma counseling needed? What has been the impact of the drug war on PNP personnel seeing maimed bodies too often? What do your family members say?
• President has admitted to using, and at one point, “abusing” Fentanyl against his doctor’s prescription. Isn’t Fentanyl a prohibited drug?
• PNP’s changing concepts/narratives and shifting numbers: Why does PNP seem to inflate, deflate numbers of those killed and arrested on occasion? Are these mistakes? Why has the PNP shifted from using just a single number for those killed to separate numbers for DUI, later murder cases under investigation, then homicide cases under investigation? What made you change the label from “killed during police operations” to “died during police operations”? What is the difference between the two concepts?
• Isn’t the PNP being too sensitive or defensive? Are the changing concepts just a PR spin for the PNP?
• DUIs, illegal guns: Except for Central Luzon, all the regions of the country show bigger numbers of DUI incidents than numbers of those killed in police operations? DUI agents more productive, in a manner of speaking, than the PNP? Do these not reflect a failure on the part of the PNP?
• If PNP could redraw Tokhang/Double Barrel, where should it make improvements? What have been the certain successes, failures of the drug war?
• Due process: Human rights groups say Tokhang/Double Barrel flouts the rule of law, and the right to due process of those killed, arrested, surrendered? It seems like drug operations have flipped the rule of law to that of the suspects considered being “guilty until proven innocent”?
• Government officials have criticized media reports on the drug war but nearly all these reports have been based on data from the PNP and official sources only. Was the resort to changing concepts and shifting numbers by the PNP over the last 10 months largely to blame?
• Espinosa and Jee Ick Joo cases: What is the status of the cases? Filed in court? Where are the respondents?
• DUI incidents: How did the PNP determine whether a case is drug-related or not? How long does an average investigation take? What does PNP do with drug-related? Not drug-related? About 60. 3 percent of the DUI cases are still under investigation, why do we still have a lot of DUIs? Are some of these homicide cases under investigation, upon determination that it is premeditated, has been covered in the DIDM tally as murder? How should we avoid double counting?
• How does the PNP define neutralization? PDEA counterparts said it could also mean “to kill”and not just to stop or to arrest.
• How should we treat the number of those killed during police operations — accomplishment or collateral damage?
• For cases against PNP personnel investigated by PNP IAS (Internal Affairs Service): Please clarify the definitions of exonerated, suspended, dismissed from service, etc. Of those determined as guilty by the IAS, what are the highest ranks of those dismissed, suspended, demoted?
• PNP PIO said data from July 1 to Jan 31 should not be connected to the data from March 1 to present, but some government agencies are doing that. How should we treat the one-month drug war break?
• Given that the police have declared 53, 785 operations conducted in line with the drug war as of May 9, meaning there were around 5,300 drug operations per month for the past ten months? How did the police do that while doing other police non-drug operations and tasks?
• #RealNumbersPH is good as a unitary report on the drug war but also swamped in riddles. It presents numbers without any explanation, numbers that are hardly comparable, or wrong numbers: The drug war has supposedly led to a decline in crime incidents/crime volume but drugs are not among the eight focus crimes that these reports are monitoring? About 10,500 drug users had supposedly been rehabilitated in 48 drug facilities (Latest DDB data show that the total bed capacity of a total of 54 drug rehab facilities (21 government, 33 private) is all of 3,529 only.)
• What is your personal take on the future of the drug war? When and how will it end?
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For Secretary Benjamin P. Reyes, chairman of the Dangerous Drugs Board (until 8 pm of May 24, 2017), interview conducted at the DDB offices, May 24, 2017, from 2 to 4:30 pm.

• What is the DDB’s perspective on the status of the drug war? Slowing down? Consistent? Constantly reinventing?
• With the new Inter-agency Committee on Anti-Illegal Drugs (ICAD), what is the role of DDB on this team-up? Which branch of the ICAD can this government work on more? On top of their game?
• In Slide 3 of #RealNumbersPH, DDB data do not match: for 2016, DDB reported data for rehab enrollees is just 6,079. Where did the 10,500 rehabilitated drug users come from? And the 48 rehab centers are not all are public entities. What is estimated cost of rehab services in private institutions?In public institutions?
• Do you agree that the Philippine Drug Market is a P120-billion industry? Why or why not?
• Based on DDB’s monitoring, was there a quantifiable 26.45 percent reduction of the estimated total drug market because of the war on drugs?
• Slide 7 of Social cards from #RealNumbersPH seem to focus more on shabu. Why is that? What other illegal drugs should the government monitor and feature?
• How much money does the government spend on the war on drugs? For Enforcement? For Advocacy? For Justice? For Rehab and Reintegration?
• Do you agree with PDEA’s 4.7 million estimate of total drug dependents in the country? What do you think about PDEA’s formula for computing this estimate? Do you agree with it? Why or why not?
• Is DDB monitoring confiscated drugs and non-drug paraphernalia? Guns? How much do we have so far?
• What is the status of new rehab facilities being built? How much donations did government receive from private and foreign partners?
• DDB Regulation No. 1, series of 2016 mandates giving out rewards for cops and other operatives based on drugs seized. How much money was given out? PDEA and PNP said they have not done this yet? How much money has been given as rewards to ordinary private citizens?
• DDB Regulation No. 3, series of 2016 detailed guidelines on surrenderees. What did the government do to the information? Where are the filled forms?
• What is the status of BADACs and Masa Masid? How many BADACs have already been organized?
• The number of drug-affected barangays rose from 32.5 to 36 percent in July 2016 to 48 percent in April 2017, reports showed. What does this mean? Should this be the guide of police on drug operations?
• How about usage of drugs for health/medical purposes and for as a cultural norm? Where does DDB draw the line?
• What is the status of “Uniform Drug Inventory and Tracking System”? (DDB Regulation 1, 2017)
• What is the status of drug testing on public officials? How many tested positive? Dismissed from service? (DDB Regulation 2, 2017)
• What were the major changes made to the National Anti-Drug Plan of Action 2015-2020 given Duterte’s campaign line on the war on drugs?
• What training and other capacity development projects have been developed for personnel in charge of rehab patients?
• How should we treat children and women surrenderees?
• Do you agree that our drug problem is so severe and should be treated as a national security issue? Why or why not?
• How should we determine success in the drug war? What is the end goal?
• When will the drug war end?

3,937 candidates in May 2016 did not file poll expense reports

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PCIJ. Number of SOCE Nonfilers by Political Party, May 2016 Elections

PRESIDENT RODRIGO R. Duterte is already on his second year as the country’s chief executive, but the polls that clinched him that post continue to bedevil the Commission on Elections (Comelec) – and with reason. Indeed, despite giving the candidates in the May 2016 elections a controversial three-week extension to submit their respective election-spending reports, thousands of candidates and a dozen political parties and party-list groups still failed to submit the required documents.

According to the Comelec Campaign Finance Office (CFO), 3,937 candidates in the May 2016 elections, as well as six political parties, and six party-list groups did not submit their Statement of Election Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) by the June 30, 2016 extended deadline. The figure reflects nine percent of the total 44,603 candidates who ran in the 2016 polls.

(The Comelec website’s election statistics page lists a total of 44,872 candidates but Comelec documents obtained by PCIJ on the total number, by regional breakdown, enrolls only 44,603 candidates.)

The list of nonfilers includes six senatorial candidates, more than 300 mayoralty candidates, and 244 bets for vice mayor. The bulk of the nonfilers, however, ran for councilor, with six of these actually winning in the polls. The seventh winner-nonfiler – a mayor — died even before he could take his oath of office. The rest of the nonfilers lost in the elections.

More than half of the SOCE nonfilers had declared themselves as Independent on their certificates of candidacy while about 10 percent (402) were affiliated with the Liberal Party.

Four other parties with more than 100 nonfilers among their respective candidates were the United Nationalist Alliance (361 or nine percent of the total nonfilers), Nationalist People’s Coalition (216 or five percent), Partido Bagong Maharlika (158 or four percent), and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (127 or three percent).

Notices coming soon

The Comelec En Banc received the list of 2016 SOCE nonfilers from the CFO last July 11. With the list having been noted by the Comelec En Banc, the CFO can now send notices to the nonfilers for them to pay the applicable administrative fine.

CFO Acting Head Efraim Bag-id says that candidates who submitted their SOCE after the June 30 deadline are still deemed nonfilers. For a first offense, nonfilers will have to pay an administrative fine of P10,000 to P30,000 depending on the position they ran for. Second-time offenders, meanwhile, will have to pay between P20,000 and P60,000, in addition to being perpetually disqualified from holding public office.

CFO lawyer Mazna Lutchavez says that the CFO is able to run after nonfilers through the contact details provided in their respective certificates of candidacy or addresses in Comelec’s voter list. Nonfilers typically pay the fine especially when they plan to run again, she says.

The last day to submit the SOCE for the 2016 elections was originally set on June 8, 2016, but it was pushed to June 30 when the Commission En Banc granted the request of the Liberal Party and its losing presidential bet Manuel ‘Mar’ A. Roxas II to move the deadline. Media reports quoted Roxas’s spokesperson Barry Gutierrez as saying that Roxas and the Liberal Party could not meet the June 8 deadline because of the “voluminous number of receipts that have to be scanned and attached.”

High court case

The Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan – under whose banner President Duterte ran — has asked the Supreme Court to revoke Comelec’s decision, which it argues is “illegal, prohibited, and void for violating the statutory mandate of Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166.”

The high court has yet to rule on the matter. Should the Supreme Court overturn Comelec’s decision to extend the deadline, the CFO staff may have to go back and review the submissions received between June 9 and June 30. The number of nonfilers could thus be higher.

Last year, CFO released a list of 873 candidates facing perpetual disqualification from holding public office for failing to file their SOCE in two elections. These candidates ran for various posts in the 2007, 2010, and 2013 elections, according to CFO.

In a May 2016 report, PCIJ had noted that at least 95 of these candidates were running again in last year’s elections, including one candidate for senator, eight for district representative, eight for governor, at least 33 for mayor, 11 for vice mayor, and 34 for councilor of various cities and towns.

CFO’s Bag-id recently confirmed that there are nonfilers who would no longer be eligible to run for office in future elections. He said that after being declared disqualified to hold public office by the Commission, these nonfilers did not elevate the matter to the Supreme Court, thus making the decision final and executory.

Court rules also allow candidates to bring such matters to the Supreme Court on certiorari within 15 days from notice of the judgment, final order, or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration.

CFO records themselves show that at least 22 nonfilers had been declared by the Comelec En Banc as having been perpetually disqualified from holding public office. Three of these cases stemmed from petitions filed by individual complainants, while the rest were initiated by Comelec motu propio through the CFO.

Certificates of Finality have been issued to 15 of the 22 cases, which means that the candidate involved did not appeal the Comelec En Banc’s decision. Certificates were issued for 12 of these 15 cases on various dates in 2016, while those for the remaining three were released in 2017. Writs of execution or orders to implement the decision, however, have been issued on only three of these 15 cases.

In the meantime, the Clerk of the Commission has yet to issue certificates of finality on seven of the 22 cases; six of these cases were decided on by the Comelec En Banc on separate dates in 2016 and the remaining case in March 2017. (When pressed for an explanation why this was so, Lutchavez said she was not sure, but offered that the office involved may have just too many tasks at the moment.)

No relief from SC

At least one past SOCE nonfiler is known to have sought redress from the Supreme Court: Joel T. Maturan who was disqualified by Comelec in September 2016 because he had failed to file his SOCE for the 2010 and 2013 elections, in which he ran for governor and mayor, respectively, in Basilan province. Allan Patiño, a registered voter, filed the petition seeking Maturan’s disqualification.

Last May, the Supreme Court affirmed Comelec’s ruling to impose perpetual disqualification on Maturan. In a unanimous decision penned by Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, the high court ruled that a candidate running for an elective post who failed to file his SOCE twice within 30 days from Election Day is perpetually disqualified to hold public office.

According to the decision, Maturan argued that he could not be disqualified because he paid a fine for not filing his SOCE in 2010, and that he withdrew his candidacy in the 2013 polls. Maturan was still able to join the gubernatorial race in Basilan in 2016, but lost to Hadjiman Salliman.
Repeat offenders

Comelec CFO is now putting together a new list of repeat nonfilers that would take into account those who had failed to submit their SOCEs for the 2016 polls. CFO says that the list will be made available to the public after it is submitted to the Comelec En Banc.

The nonfiler list for those who ran for senator in 2016 elections include two retired police generals, a former provincial governor, and a veteran senator:

* Ibrahim Hussein Albani (Independent);
* Mustapha M. Kabalu (Independent);
* Mark T. Lapid (AKSYON);
* Romeo B. Maganto (LAKAS);
* Sergio R. Osmeña III (Independent); and
* Jovito S. Palparan Jr. (Independent).

A check on previous lists of non-filers shows that Osmeña and Albani also failed to file their SOCE in the 2010 polls. PCIJ tried to reach Albani by phone and email and Osmeña by email but failed to get a comment from either.

Winners list

Meanwhile, Palanan, Isabela Mayor Angelito A. Bernardo, who appears on the Comelec CFO’s 2016 SOCE nonfilers list, died just days after being re-elected in last year’s polls. The six other nonfiler-winners last year are:

• Sulat, Eastern Samar Councilor Yolanda J. Necesito;
• Socorro, Surigao del Norte Councilor Cesar M. Galanida;
• Al-Barka, Basilan Councilor Hapjira A. Jamlani;
• Balabagan, Lanao del Sur Councilor Saguira D. Inog;
• Shariff Agua, Maguindanao Councilor Hadie N. Malaguial; and
•South Upi, Maguindanao Councilor Warlito D. Pinuela.

Should not sit?

R.A. No. 7166 states that these winning candidates cannot take on the duties of his/her office without his/her SOCE. Also in similar trouble are election winners whose parties did not file SOCEs. According to CFO, parties that did not submit SOCEs in 2016 were:

* Centrist Democratic Party of the Philippines;
* Workers Peasants Party;
* Partido Balikatan ng Bataan;
* Mindoro Sandugo Para sa Kaunlaran;
* Una ang Makati; and
* Kilusang Diwa ng Taguig.

Comelec data show that the Centrist Democratic Party of the Philippines fielded at least 43 candidates for the 2016 polls. Three of these candidates won: Alaminos City Councilor Margielou Orange D. Humilde and Cagayan de Oro City Councilors Teodulfo E. Lao Jr. and Enrico D. Salcedo.

Six party-list groups failed to submit SOCEs after the 2016 elections as well, although none of them won a seat in the House of Representatives:
* Anti War/Anti-Terror Mindanao Peace Movement;
* Alagaan Natin Ating Kalusugan;
* Alliance for National Urban Poor Organizations Assembly, Inc.;
* National Confederation of Tricycles Operators and Drivers Association of the Phils., Inc.;
* Ugnayan ng Maralita Laban sa Kahirapan; and
* Partido Manggagawa.

ARMM tops list

By geographical area, more than 40 percent of the SOCE nonfilers or 1,765 candidates came from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Calabarzon had the next highest number of nonfilers with 248, followed by Northern Mindanao with 228.

In terms of compliance rates, ARMM had the lowest at 56 percent, followed by Metro Manila at 88 percent.
Central Visayas, Caraga, and Central Luzon posted high compliance at 97 percent each. The national average is 91 percent.

Comelec Resolution No. 9991 sets the scale of administrative fines for SOCE non-filers by the position that the offender ran for in the elections, as follows:

Download (PDF, 71KB)

— With research and reporting by Karol Ilagan, PCIJ, August 2017


Only 54 overspenders of 44,600 bets in May 2016

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ONE WOULD think that the Commission on Elections (Comelec) should be happy that the number of candidates who went over the prescribed campaign spending limits in last year’s elections plunged drastically from the 2013 figure. But that doesn’t seem to be the case, with the poll body’s Campaign Finance Office (CFO), saying it is still 54 too many.

In the 2013 midterm polls, 936 out of 44,449 candidates went beyond the spending caps. That number dropped dramatically to 54 out of 44,603 total candidates in the 2016 national elections, or a whopping percentage decrease of 94.

(The Comelec website’s election statistics page lists a total of 44,872 candidates but Comelec documents obtained by PCIJ on the total number, by regional breakdown, enrolls only 44,603 candidates.)

In 2016, a total of 18,083 positions went up for grabs, compared with 18,054 in 2013 — for a similar average of two to three candidates contesting a position.

Last year’s overspenders even include two who went over their lawful spending limit by just P10 — Pata Mayor Anton J. Burahan of Sulu and Kapatagan Councilor Medalia T. Bansil of Lanao del Sur — but CFO Acting Head Efraim Bag-id says that the CFO identified the overspenders regardless how much they exceeded the allowable amount. The law, he adds, does not qualify the amounts in which cases may be prosecuted.

“The Campaign Finance (Office) — the Comelec — is really serious to prosecute violators of overspending,” says Bag-id. “Magiging precedent kasi ito eh. Regardless, kung malaki or maliit, nag-overspend ka (This would serve as a precedent, you see. Regardless if the amount is big or small, you still overspent).”

Big, small amounts

Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7166 or the 1991 Synchronized Election Law, local candidates may spend P3 for every voter currently registered in the constituency they filed their certificate of candidacy. A candidate running without a political party or support from any political party meanwhile may be allowed to spend P5 for every such voter.

The CFO even found two candidates in the 2013 polls who each overspent by less than a peso: mayoral candidate Nelieta Q. Noval of Tubod, Lanao del Norte who went over the limit by 50 centavos, and Edgar C. Padayao, who overspent by 70 centavos when he ran for councilor in Paoay, Ilocos Norte.

The biggest overspenders in the 2013 polls, though, went beyond the cap by millions of pesos: Mussah Mohammad Muksan and Halkin Appang Arasain who ran for mayor and councilor of Siasi, Sulu, respectively. Muksan declared spending P60 million, and Arasain P10.45 million. The expenditure limit for candidates in Siasi, a second-class municipality of less than 70,000 people, is only P60,114 each.

Muksan’s P60-million spending bill in 2013 indicates per capita spending of P886.19 per person, not necessarily all voters, in his town. Arasain’s overspending bill would come up to P154.35 poll spending per resident of Siasi.

While Muksan and Arasain both overspent the most by amount and percentage of the limit in 2013, Manuel A. Morente Jr., candidate for Oriental Mindoro provincial board member, overspent the most by amount in 2016. Morente spent P1.65 million even though the limit was at P596,193.

By percentage of the expenditure limit, independent candidate Adil Batawi Sultan, who ran for mayor in Piagapo, Lanao del Sur, was on top of the 2016 list of overspenders. Sultan spent P600,000 or seven times more the authorized amount of P71,905.

No national candidate or any local candidate from Metro Manila was among the list of overspenders in 2016 elections. Nine local candidates from the National Capital Region, however, were identified in the 2013 polls.

Subpoenas due out

Comelec is already set to file charges against the 2013 campaign overspenders, with media reports quoting Comelec Commissioner Luie Tito F. Guia as saying that the poll body is now in the process of reviewing their case files for eventual indictment.

The CFO meanwhile has submitted the list of those who overspent in the 2016 elections before the Comelec En Banc and the Law Department for action. Bag-id says that the Law Department will conduct a preliminary investigation that would involve a review of the CFO’s findings and issuance of subpoenas to respondents for them to appear on a date and submit their statements.

Tasked to audit the thousands of Statements of Election Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) submitted to Comelec, the CFO compared two sets of information to identify overspending candidates: their declared expenditures plus receipts and the expenditure limit prescribed in law.

The penalties for overspenders include the loss of one’s right to vote and a jail term of one to six years. Those who were elected into office would also lose their post.

Comelec already unseated Laguna Governor Emilio Ramon ‘E.R.’ Ejercito III for election overspending in the 2013 polls. Ejercito spent P23.56 million even though the legal cap applicable to his position was P4.57 million. The Supreme Court affirmed his disqualification in February 2015. He ran again for Laguna governor in 2016 but lost.

Comelec lawyer Sonia Bea Wee explains that Ejercito was able to run again last year because the Commission’s decision to disqualify him on the basis of overspending was “on the administrative aspect only and can only bind him for the 2013 elections and 2013-2016 term.”

“Perpetual disqualification to hold public office, imprisonment, and losing the right to vote are penalties imposed as a result of a criminal conviction for overspending, which only the court can impose after successful prosecution of a criminal case against him,” says Wee. Ejercito’s case was not filed in court.

Elected overspenders

Aside from Ejercito, nearly half or 454 of the 936 overspenders in 2013 won their coveted posts. But the CFO was still reviewing the 2013 SOCEs when Ejercito’s political rival Edgar ‘Egay’ San Luis filed a petition for disqualification against him for overspending; Comelec granted the petition. The rest of the 2013 overspenders were able to keep their seats because the CFO — which up till now has not been assigned plantilla items to hire full-time personnel — finished drawing up its list of 2013 overspenders only early this year.

Says Wee: “When lawyers were hired for the CFO — there were only two of them — they initially focused their efforts on 2010 overspending cases, which had to be filed by 2015, or else the offenses prescribe after five years. Due to the limitations in human resources, tasks had to be prioritized. In the months prior to the May 2016 (polls), we had to shift our focus to training our field officers to properly receive the SOCEs, and right after elections, to check SOCE submission compliance.”

As for the 2016 overspenders, 21 were elected into office, with the three highest officials from Sultan Kudarat among them: Suharto T. Mangudadatu, 1st District Representative of Sultan Kudarat; Datu Pax Pakung Mangudadatu, provincial governor; and Raden Camlian Sakaluran, vice governor.

The 2016 list also has seven incumbent mayors, four vice mayors, and seven provincial board members.

Two current mayors — Burahan of Pata, Sulu and Zigfred P. Duterte of Tabogon, Cebu – as well as a candidate for councilor, Naim B. Alimosa of Bayang, Lanao del Sur, appear in both the 2016 and 2013 lists. Interestingly, while Burahan exceeded the limit by only P10 last year, he was 10 times over the cap in 2013.

(PCIJ called and sent formal letters of request for an interview or comment to 11 of the 21 incumbents on Comelec’s 2016 overspenders list. The rest could not be reached via their published office numbers, so letters were sent to them by post. PCIJ has yet to receive any reply from the incumbent overspenders.)

ARMM hosts the most

The total amount candidates overspent in the 2013 elections came up to P128.2 million. In 2016, the amount reached a more modest P4.89 million.

It’s unclear why the number of overspenders dropped dramatically between 2013 and 2016, although the development is obviously welcome. Yet while there is a good chance that Ejercito’s much publicized case may have made candidates in 2016 more cautious about their spending, it could also be that there were candidates who simply under-reported their expenses.

The 2016 overspenders are spread across 13 regions although some 40 percent come from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). One of its five provinces, Lanao del Sur, has the highest number of overspenders: 17, or 31 percent of the total.

Lanao del Sur also had the most number of overspenders in the 2013 midterm polls: 162, or 17 percent of the total. Similarly, ARMM had the most number of overspending candidates – nearly 30 percent of the total — in those elections.

ARMM is the poorest of the country’s 18 administrative regions. The poverty incidence rate in ARMM is 48.2 percent, or almost triple the national average of 16.5 percent. ARMM’s per capita gross regional domestic product of P27,345 is also the lowest in the country and just 19 percent of the national average of P140,259 (as of 2016). ARMM has a population of 3,781,387 and an Internal Revenue Allotment of P19.8 billion, the fifth lowest allocation among all regions in 2016.

Lanao del Sur, meanwhile, is the Philippines’ most impoverished of the 81 provinces of the Philippines. It has a population of 1,045,429, the largest in ARMM, according to the 2015 census.

Lanao del Sur’s capital Marawi, whose mayor Majul Usman Gandamra is among the 2016 campaign overspenders, has been under siege by ISIS-linked extremist groups for more than two months now. More than 500 people have been killed in the conflict so far, among them at least 45 civilians and 105 soldiers and police officers.

Many independents

Comelec’s official list of candidates show that in 2016, about 20 percent or 16 of the 54 overspending candidates ran as independents while 10 (or 18 percent) belonged to the Liberal Party (LP). Seven other overspenders were from the Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC) and six from the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA). The rest of the overspenders came from nine other parties.

By comparison, the 936 overspenders in the 2013 polls were spread over 42 political parties, with the LP having the most: 377, or 40 percent of the total. Candidates who ran as independents, though, made up the second biggest group of overspenders at 94, or 10 percent of the total.

Also among 2013’s top overspending groups or parties were: the Nacionalista Party (NP), 79; UNA, 73; NPC, 72; National Unity Party (NUP), 52; Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-LABAN), 37; Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino (PMP), 17; and Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (LKS-CMD), nine. (Comelec records did not indicate the party of 42 overspending candidates.)

Bills to raise caps

For sure, critics of the campaign spending limits have long clamored for increasing the amounts that candidates may be allowed in election campaigns. Some nine bills seeking to amend R.A. No. 7166 have been filed in the House of Representatives while one other bill is in the Senate.

Senate President Aquilino ‘Koko’ Pimentel III filed Senate Bill No. 1178, arguing that candidates find it difficult to limit their spending because prices of campaign materials such as printing, political advertisements, transportation, and other operational expenses have noticeably increased in the past two decades.

Citing Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas data, Pimentel’s bill states that there has been 259.5-percent increase in the prices of commodities from 1991 to 2015. The value of P1 in 1991 is now equivalent P3.60. The National Economic and Development Authority or NEDA, according to the bill, also projected that the P3 used in election-related spending in 1991 is actually equivalent to P9.10 in 2016.

Pimentel says that these data show that the figures used in R.A. No. 7166, which was passed in 1991, are outdated especially for local candidates who cannot take advantage of economies of scale in their purchase of campaign materials. The senator says that the best way to address the issue is to increase the amount of allowable political campaign expenditure.

Pimentel proposes the following changes:

For candidates with a political party or with support from a political party:
– President from P10 under R.A.No. 7166*, to P20.00
– Vice President, from P10 to P15.00
– Member, House of Representatives (Legislative District, from P3.00 to P10.00
– Governor, Mayor, from P3.00 to P10.00
– Vice Governor, Vice Mayor, from P3.00 to P8.00
– Member, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang Bayan, from P3.00 to P5.00

Note: Amount for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the certificate of candidacy was filed.

For political parties, from P5.00 to P20.00; and
• For candidates without any political party or without support from any political party, from P5.00 to P10.00.

Pimentel, however, says that the spending cap for barangay elective positions should remain at P3 for every registered voter. This is because, he says, barangay elections are non­partisan and “should be less ‘bloody’ than the other elections.”

At the House of Representatives, the proposed increases vary by bill author. Quezon City Rep. Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., for instance, seeks only to increase the spending limit for president and vice president from P10 to P50, and for political parties from P5 to P30. In House Bill No. 15, the lawmaker didn’t propose to amend the limit for other candidates such as senators and local candidates.

In the meantime, Pangasinan Rep. Marlyn L. Primicias-Agabas, in House Bill No. 3249, seeks to raise the spending cap for president and vice president from P10 to P30 and for political parties from P5 to P25. In addition, she proposes to increase the allowed expenditure for candidates running for senator and other positions to P20 instead of P3 per voter. Candidates without a party would be allowed to spend P25 per voter.

Both Belmonte and Primicias-Agabas’s bills also include a provision authorizing Comelec to adjust the amount based on the Consumer Price Index every five years. — With research and reporting by Karol Ilagan, PCIJ, August 2017

Iloilo City bets for mayor fail to report full bill for radio ads

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IN THEIR bid to be Iloilo City’s chief executive from 2016 to 2019, then incumbent Mayor Jed Patrick Mabilog (Liberal Party) and Dr. Marigold Gonzalez (Independent, but with support from the United Nationalist Alliance) staged a costly advertising war that later ran into a total of more than P1 million for radio spots alone.

Yet when time came to submit their respective Statement of Expenditures and Contributions (SOCE) to the Commission on Elections (Comelec), it seemed only a portion of the radio spots were accounted for in Mabilog’s documents, while no such item appeared in Gonzalez’s papers at all.

Both also did not list any expenditure for several campaign standards such as compensation of campaigners, clerks, messengers and other personnel; communication costs, including landline and mobile phone fees, internet access, and courier charges; employment of watchers at the polls; and rent and maintenance of headquarters or meeting sites.

Gonzalez declared a measly P49,402.50 in expenditures for the entire 45 days of official campaigning. Mabilog, for his part, said in his SOCE that his campaign expenditures reached P582,433.78.

Nielsen Media monitoring of political ads in Iloilo City from March to May 2016 showed, though, that based on published rate cards, radio spots paid for Gonzalez amounted to P671,040 in April and the first week of May, while radio spots paid for Mabilog amounted P688,822 during the same period.

Classified as first class in terms of income, the Western Visayan city of Iloilo has a population of 448,000 and a land area of 7,834 hectares. During the May 9, 2016 elections, it had 261,481 registered voters. At P3 per voter, this means Gonzalez and Mabilog each had a campaign spending limit of P784,443.

The daughter of the late Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez Sr., Gonzalez was seeking a political comeback for her family. Her brother Raul Jr. lost in the congressional election in 2010, and Gonzalez was determined to give the mayoralty fight her best shot.

Mabilog, meanwhile, was as resolved to continue being mayor and have his third and last term. But he also apparently did not underestimate the capacity of his main foe to crush him, aware that his previous alliance with the Gonzalezes had been an important chapter in his political career. (There was a third candidate as well, Arnel de la Llana, who ran as an Independent, but neither Gonzalez nor Mabilog appeared to consider him a threat.)

In the end, Mabilog got to keep his seat as mayor, winning 148,658 votes over Gonzalez’s 53,371. (De la Llana got 1,609 votes.)

In his SOCE, Mabilog said that he received a P250,000 cash donation from balikbayan-businessman Joebert Evidente, as well as an in-kind donation, particularly TV ads worth P247,643.76, from another balikbayan-businessman, Leoncio ‘Guy’ Garcia. The rest of his campaign funds were from his own pocket; Mabilog did not list any contribution from his party, which considers Iloilo city and province as its political bailiwick.

Mabilog’s SOCE says that he spent P20,998.62 or 3.6 percent of his expenditures on fuel and P13,380 or 2.29 percent on tarpaulins.

But the bulk of his P548,055.16 expenditure – about 94 percent – was for radio and TV ads. According to his SOCE, these were for political ads run by ABS-CBN (P259,783.16); Bombo Radyo Philippines (P90,272); GMA Network (P50,000); MBC-Aksyon Radyo (P40,000); and Radio Mindanao Network or RMN (P108,000).

It’s unclear if the mentioned ads run by BomboRadyo and RMN in Mabilog’s SOCE cover those monitored by Nielsen during April and the first week of May. Then again, the amounts in his SOCE and those by Nielsen don’t quite match.

Nielsen monitored 12 30-seconder Mabilog radio ads in April that were aired by DYFM-AM/837 KHZ (BomboRadyo-Iloilo) amounting to P81,600. By the first week of May, Mabilog’s radio pol ads had surged to 66, which were aired in various primetime programs of BomboRadyoIloilo and DYRI-AM/774 KHZ or RMN Iloilo; these reached a total of P607,200.

Of these 78 radio pol ads, 66 were paid for by “Friends of Mayor Jed Mabilog” while 12 were paid by his spokesperson, lawyer Mark Piad.

Missing in Mabilog’s SOCE as well were expenditures for political rallies and meetings. By comparison, these were present in Gonzalez’s SOCE, in which she said she spent P25,402.50 for political meetings and rallies and the use of sound systems, lights, and decoration. She also said she spent P24,000 for stationery, printing, and distribution of campaign materials.

But Gonzalez’s SOCE lists no expenditure or donation for political ads, even though in April Nielsen had recorded a total of 60 30-seconder ads espousing her crusade to help the downtrodden. Costing a total of P498,000 and aired by Aksyon Radyo Iloilo, these radio ads were paid for by “Friends” of Gonzalez.

Days before election day, Gonzalez also had 12 30-seconder pol ads aired in Aksyon Radyo Iloilo and 18 15-seconder aired in BomboRadyo-Iloilo, according to Nielsen. Focused on the return of her family’s brand of public service and free hospitalization, and fighting corruption, all these 30 ads were paid for by “Friends of Dr. Gold Gonzalez.” Based on published rate cards, they cost a total of P173,040.

Gonzalez’s SOCE does not list any donors or contributions. This writer tried to reach her for comment, but she was then vacationing in the United States.

Meanwhile, Mayor Mabilog’s spokesperson Piad described the campaign of Mabilog as “according to the laws and rules set by the Comelec.”

“Before the start of the campaign, Mayor Mabilog was calling our attention to make sure that we don’t exceed the limits provided for the law,” Piad said. “With the radio ads, I was the one who was actually really monitoring it. I made sure that we complied with the minutes, with the spending allowed by Comelec.”

It was Piad who prepared Mabilog’s SOCE, which means he should know what ads were placed for the mayor. Still, he said that he was unaware there were ads paid for by “Friends,” although he did not seem totally surprised when told about these.

“If it passes through me, the requirements in radio are very strict, because you have to disclose who these people are,” Piad said. So if it passes through me, definitely there will be names and addresses because those are the standards set for by the Comelec. But there are other supporters whom we don’t know of, whom we have limited or no control of. As far as I know, I have no idea (about ads paid for by friends).”

Piad also said that they were able to keep campaign expenses relatively tight by tapping social media.

“One thing that we really took advantage of sa campaign ni Mayor Mabilog was social media,” he said.” We all know that almost everybody is in social media so we really took advantage of technology. If we look at it, we don’t have to really spend on that aspect. Or we don’t have to spend on Facebook – I mean you just put up a poster, you tagged people, eventually if there are other people or supporters who like and share, it becomes massive.”

“The most of our communications were made through social media, through Facebook, Messenger,” Piad continued. “It is easier to spread information or communicate that way because you know when the other party had seen it, what time they had seen it, you know that the message came across. We really took advantage of technology, the social media. Number one, it’s free, so, almost all of us have FB accounts. That’s one thing we didn’t spend on, communication, because everybody is on Facebook.”

Piad said Mabilog did not incur expenses for manpower as well because a strong group of volunteers like the Red Ladies.

“Well, most of them were volunteers,” Piad explained. “If you recall we have volunteer groups nga very supportive kay Mayor Mabilog, especially ang Red Ladies. They are very supportive of him. Most of it were efforts of volunteers coming together to show their support for Mayor Jed.”

Expenses were further kept at a minimum with the volunteers just getting posters at the campaign headquarters, he said. “There were campaign materials in the HQ, then the volunteers would just go there…(and) get how many posters they want. It was really not distributed to them. We don’t really have a group that will go to one place and put up posters. (And we don’t give them anything in return.”

Piad added that “sa headquarters, wala man kami gasto. It was lent to us for free, so walang gasto.”

As for why there were no expenditures for political rallies in Mabilog’s SOCE, Piad recalled that most of grand sorties held in the city were with the national candidates of LP.

In any event, Election Officer (EO) IV lawyer Reinier Layson of Comelec-Iloilo City expressed surprise when told that several radio ads paid for Mabilog and Gonzalez by undisclosed or unnamed persons were aired, and then later not reflected in their SOCEs.

Thinking aloud, he said that a candidate must first accept the ads paid for him or her, and that this must be ensured by media outlets before airing any political ad. Explained Layson: “When there is no acceptance by the candidate, he can deny it and say, ‘That should not be counted against me or that airtime’.”

He said that without such acceptance, political ads should not be aired.

Dapat hindi (They shouldn’t be),” Layson said. “The media outfits must be responsible enough to know they have a duty or are duty-bound to follow strictly what is provided by the law. And if they don’t follow, it is a clear violation of the law, and an election offense.”

Layson, who was temporarily assigned in Antique during the campaign period, also commented after looking at the SOCEs of Gonzalez and Mabilog, “Practically speaking, the stated cost (for stationery, printing, and distribution of printed materials) here does not reflect the actual number of campaign material posted in the city. It raises a question: Is it really true? But we are not in the position to determine, to find out if it is true or not, because we only rely on their statements.”

He also said that election officers like him are tasked only to receive the SOCE, ensure its attachments are complete, then forward the document to the Campaign Finance Office (CFO) in Manila.

“In fact,” said Layson, “our duty here is ministerial, and we only receive this (SOCE), and we only — of course after checking, if they have complied with the procedures sa filing, including all the attachments, which should be complete – forward everything to the Campaign Finance Office. They are the ones who verify and of course scrutinize the entries of our candidates.”

But while he left to the CFO the task of going over Gonzalez and Mabilog’s SOCEs with a fine-toothed comb, Layson said that he cannot blame candidates if they do not put everything that they should in their SOCEs. Instead, he blamed what he described as an obsolete law mandating the campaign-spending cap.

“What hinders them in declaring the true cost of their candidacy is because of the limitations provided by the law on how much they can actually spend for their candidacy,” he said. “That’s really dated na, matagal na ‘yung law na ‘yun (the law is already old). We have to factor in the inflation. The cost of a candidate’s campaign in the previous election is probably cheaper compared to now. The value of our money devaluates due to inflation.”

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7166 or the Synchronized National and Local Elections Act provides the mechanics on how to calculate the legal campaign spending limits for candidates and parties. The law was enacted on Nov. 26, 1991, when the exchange rate between Philippine peso and the U.S. dollar was about P27 to $1.

Layson thinks that it is about time Congress enacts a more responsive and more up-to-date law pertaining to campaign finance, indicating that the spending limits have simply not kept up with the times and are now unrealistic. In other words, candidates are being forced to make do with campaigns that may not really work because they are underfunded, or spend and then lie about the cost later.

“If we look at it, we cannot really find fault with the candidates because they are also scared that if they declare the true amount of their campaign expenses, that would only mean them committing an election offense,” Layson said. “That would only mean disqualification against them. So, in the first place it would defeat their purpose of running for a certain elective office, and being elected into that, only to be disqualified later on, and to be convicted later on of an election offense, having declared honestly the actual amount spent for their candidacy.”

He pointed out, “If this will not be addressed by the Congress immediately prior to the next elections, then our CF monitoring will still be a rehash of the previous (election), this is what we will also see.” — PCIJ, August 2017
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* Maricyn A. de los Santos is a reporter for the Iloilo City-based The Daily Guardian and writes for the Philippines News Agency. She had also worked as desk editor of The Daily Guardian and The News Today, and as head writer of Pinoy Parazzi.

Bask in name recall, spend a mite: Or how Duterte’s kids win elections

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CANDIDATES IN Philippine elections usually complain about what many of them say are outdated, low campaign-spending caps. But the Dutertes of Davao City apparently have no problem with spending limits – at least when they’re running in their family’s political turf.

As a mayoralty candidate of Davao City in the 2016 elections, Sara Duterte-Carpio spent only P138,800 for her campaign or a mere 5.29 percent of the P2,621,010 cap per bet (with a party) for the post. Older brother Paolo Duterte meanwhile spent just P77,270.50 on his second run as vice mayor, which translates to some three percent of the maximum spending limit (calculated to be P3 multiplied by Davao’s 873,670 registered voters).

The Duterte siblings’ formula to keep well under the cap is simple: have a recognizable name that is also heavily associated with the area in which they are seeking a post. Indeed, brother and sister seemed to have been so confident of clinching the vice mayor and mayor seats respectively that they hardly campaigned for themselves. Instead, Sara, 38, joined the 30-day Visayas and Mindanao campaign caravan of their father Rodrigo, who was then running for President. Paolo, 41, took to Luzon to help Rodrigo with his campaign there.

The country’s queen of cities down south, Davao is a 244,400-hectare, first-class metropolis. It has a population of about 1.63 million people, most of whom are now used to having a Duterte at the municipio.
Rodrigo Duterte became Davao City’s acting vice mayor in May 1986. He would later become its mayor from 1988 to 1998, and then from 2001 to 2010, and finally from 2013 to 2016. He was the city’s 1st District representative from 1998 to 2001. When his daughter Sara was mayor from 2010 to 2013, Rodrigo was the vice mayor.

Sara has also had her turn as vice mayor of Davao City, from 2007 to 2010. When Rodrigo decided to run for mayor once more in 2013, though, it was Paolo who stepped up to vie for the vice mayoralty seat, running unopposed.

Paolo again had no rivals in the 2016 elections. Sara, however, was challenged by independent candidates such as Teodoro Mantilla and Kilat Tocante. She ended up winning, like her brother.

Paolo and Sara submitted their respective Statements of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) along with official receipts stating the particulars of their expenditures. In Paolo’s case, at least one receipt was made out not to him in particular, but to “Vice Mayor Office” (sic).

Paolo also indicated in his SOCE that he spent P45,580.50 on the printing and distribution of materials relative to his candidacy, and another P31,690 for sample ballots.

As for Sara, her SOCE indicated that the entire amount that she said she spent went to campaign materials. She would later say in an interview that her expenses were “for tarps, posters, and stickers.”

Neither she nor Paolo included in their SOCEs compensation for campaigners, clerks, stenographers, messengers, and other people they might have employed in the campaign. They also did not hire poll watchers.

Jefry Tupas, who was a Duterte campaign volunteer and now Davao City’s Information Officer, says that the Duterte siblings did not need to employ anyone because people volunteered to help them. Paolo himself said in an interview, “We did not pay for people to campaign for us. We did not even campaign for ourselves. I did not campaign for myself. We campaigned for my father. And everyone who joined us in the campaign were our friends and volunteers.”

He clarified, however, that the bulk of his expenses went to the printing of tarpaulins for his party. Both Paolo and Sara ran under Hugpong sa Tawong Lungsod, a local political party established by Rodrigo in the early 2000s.

According to its own SOCE, the party spent a total of P1,117,943.05 or about 26 percent of the maximum amount allowed it. Hugpong also said that it received contributions that reached a total of P1,150,000. Its donors were Sara’s husband, lawyer Manases R. Carpio, lawyer Elijah Manuel Pepito, engineer Rosario Rosita Pilar G. Borromeo, engineer Gerald Jun L. Borromeo, businesswoman Joanne Beverly C. Lao, lawyer Leopoldo Leuterio Jr., and lawyer Israel Torentera.

Based on its SOCE, Hugpong spent most of its campaign funds on the hiring of poll watchers (P768,000), followed by the printing of campaign materials (P132,000), employment of counsel (P105,000), communications (P40,650), and finally travel expenses (P25,848.05).

Notably, however, Hugpong’s SOCE did not include any expenditure for a political rally, even though it had at least one that was held on April 4, 2016 at 6 p.m. at the J. Cruz Elementary School Covered Court in Panacan. Paolo Duterte was apparently at that rally, along with the then councilors of the city’s 2nd District.

Lawyer Marlon Casquejo, Comelec officer for the city’s 1st Congressional District says that if Hugpong were proven to have committed a violation of election-campaign rules, its “secretary general could face imprisonment and should pay the appropriate fine.” But he says that for any investigation to take place, Comelec must first receive a complaint. He also says that the complaint must include evidence that a political rally was indeed conducted, even though nothing of the sort is in the party’s SOCE.

Political analyst Ramon Baleno meantime comments that Davao City residents may tend to accept whatever the Dutertes say in their SOCEs, regardless of whether or not these are accurate. He also says that one negative impact of a place turning into a politician or a clan’s bailiwick is that voters there tend not to mature electorally and politically and become dependent on one person or family.

But he allows, “The Dutertes have massive support because of the programs that the people love.” Thus, even though poverty incidence in Davao City has increased (the latest available statistics show it has risen from 13.2 percent in 2009 to 25 percent in 2012), Davaoeños still believe in the Dutertes because they feel secure and happy with the basic services provided by the local government.

In truth, the Duterte name is so resonant among Davaoeños that other politicians use it in their own quests for local posts. For instance, SOCEs of the candidates for councilors in the 2016 elections show that the top campaign spenders among them had used the Dutertes in their tarpaulins, sample ballots, and campaign jingles – and later received the most number of votes. These candidates for councilor – Maria Belen Acosta, Melchor Qutain, Bonifacio Militar, Danilo Dayanghirang, and Cherry Ann Bonguyan – each spent at least P400,000, far more than the campaign bills of Sara and Paolo Duterte.

But then Baleno says that in fact, the Dutertes had been spending – during the “pre-election campaign period,” which is not covered by SOCEs. The Ateneo de Davao political science department head explains that “in political science, pre-election is the period after they won and took oath.” This would be when local officials embark on populist projects like basketball courts.

“Since they (the Dutertes) are already established, they do not need to campaign extensively in the election period,” says Baleno. He adds, though, that this is worrying since it only means the matter of who will take office has already been settled even way before the polling centers open.

Says Baleno: “It is a sign that there is no choice and in elections choices are really needed.” — PCIJ, August 2017
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* Ma. Cecilia Badian is a justice reporter for the Davao City-based Mindanao Times.

Bets for president, VP, senator splurge P5.8B in May 2016 polls

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ELECTIONS 2016’s 50 candidates for national office and the political parties that fielded them spent P5.8 billion across the 90-day campaign period, PCIJ has found in its review of documents submitted to the country’s poll body.

But small and big discrepancies clutter the election-spending reports that the five candidates for president, six for vice president, and 39 for senator, as well as their political parties, had submitted to the Commission on Elections (Comelec).

Fortunately, the various documents that Comelec has required the candidates and their political parties to submit in their Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCEs) were precisely designed to allow for comparison and validation.

A consistent string of amounts would result only when the filers (candidates and parties), as well as their contractors (mass media, printers, etc.), had complied fully and faithfully with the poll body’s campaign finance rules.

An inconsistent string of amounts should raise red flags of two types: the candidates or parties may have spent beyond lawful limits on campaign spending for the position they have sought, or simply perjured and lied in their SOCEs.

As it is, the amounts that the 2016 national candidates said they spent on political ads, and the amounts that media agencies said they collected from the candidates, are a problematic pair.

P5.4 B in pol ads

PCIJ reviewed the amounts enrolled in the SOCEs that these candidates filed with the Comelec against related documents from the mass-media agencies that hosted their ads and monitoring reports by Nielsen Media of the ads that were actually aired and published, and paid for or by the candidates between Feb. 9 and May 7 last year.

The amounts differed by small and big values. In many cases, the candidates reported in their SOCEs bigger spending on political ads, in contrast to the amounts that media agencies had registered in their receipts and advertising contracts. In fewer cases, some candidates understated in their SOCEs their political ad spending, while media agencies reported bigger amounts.

Still, PCIJ’s review reveals that of the nearly P6 billion spent by the national candidates during the official campaign period, only P400 million or 6.9 percent went to travel expenses, compensation of campaigners, communications, stationery, printing and distribution, employment of poll watchers, rent and maintenance, and political meetings and rallies of the candidates and their parties. The bulk or P5.4 billion went to political-ad placements on various media.

Surprisingly, just four senators out of the 50 national candidates whose SOCEs were reviewed by PCIJ reported having spent for poll watchers. Among the political parties, only the Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), the United Nationalist Alliance (UNA), and the Nacionalista Party reported incurring bills for the same expense.

Can’t buy love

A lot of money did not buy a lot of love from voters for many big spenders, though. The few exceptions are then Congresswoman and now Vice President Maria Leonor ‘Leni’ Robredo and seven senatorial contenders who got elected.

In their run for the presidency, Sen. Grace Poe, former senator and Local Government Secretary Manuel ‘Mar’ Roxas II, then Vice President Jejomar ‘Jojo’ Binay, and the late Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago reported spending P510.8 million, P487.3 million, P463.4 million, and P74.7 million, respectively.

In contrast, the victor, former Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte, reported spending only P371.5 million to become the nation’s 16th president. Of the five candidates for president, Duterte placed No. 4 in terms of political-ad spending.

As a group, the five candidates for president reported spending a total of P1.91 billion on their campaign. In the May 2010 presidential race, eight candidates ran and spent just P1.58 billion, including their own money, or P330 million less.

In May 2016, of the 55.7 million registered voters, a significant 81.95 percent or 44.55 million actually voted. In May 2010, of the 51.32 million registered voters, a lower 74.34 percent or 38.14 million actually voted.

Big spenders lost

In the senatorial race, losing candidates Francis Tolentino, Francisco ‘Isko Moreno’ Domagoso, Teofisto Guingona III, Carlos Jericho Petilla, and Ferdinand Martin Romualdez placed ranked Nos. 1, 7, 10, 11, and 12, respectively, in terms of the amounts they binged on political ads.

Some of those who lost in the money game actually won Senate seats. Five candidates for senator won even with much less money spent on political ads: Juan Miguel Zubiri, Leila de Lima, Panfilo Lacson, Emmanuel ‘Manny’ Pacquiao, and Vicente ‘Tito’ Sotto III who placed Nos. 13, 14, 15, 18, and 19, respectively, in terms of the amounts they paid for political ads.

(PCIJ was unable to review the submitted SOCEs of five senatorial candidates. Six candidates meanwhile did not submit SOCEs at all. Of those whose SOCEs PCIJ was able to look at, seven did not report spending any amounts on political ads, while one, Rey Langit, said that he did not spend a centavo on his campaign at all.)

Without a doubt, political ads are the shortest route for candidates to make voters recall their names, faces, and taglines. A 15-second or 30-second TV or radio ad does not allow for any discussions of the candidates’ platform, however. Even a whole-page ad in a broadsheet should not be text-heavy but, so advertisers say, just offer eye candy.

In the end, volumes of political ads failed to guarantee victory for all the candidates. SOCEs and advertising contracts submitted to Comelec showed that some of the biggest pol-ad spenders also lost big in the elections.

Of the five candidates for president, Grace Poe Llamanzares spent the most on political ads, by her SOCE submission and receipted ad contracts. Hers was P159 million more than what elected President Rodrigo Duterte declared as political-ad expenses. Binay meanwhile overshot Duterte’s declared pol-ad spending by P113 million. Mar Roxas, who placed second in the presidential race, spent P63 million more than Duterte, by SOCE submission, and P32 million more by receipted ad contracts.

Vice President Leni Robredo, however, managed to win big after spending big, declaring political-ad expenses that reached P387 million, based on her SOCE declarations. Robredo bested all five other vice presidential contenders in pol-ad spending based on these documents.

Didn’t breach caps?

A caveat in this analysis is that while Comelec’s campaign-finance rules are designed to allow for sets of documents that could be validated with one another, this is possible only when all the concerned parties follow the rules truthfully.

Campaign-finance rules, after all, employ a self-reporting mechanism for candidates and political parties, and they are unlikely to declare more than what they are allowed by law to spend on their campaigns. In fact, in the May 2016 elections, all the national candidates reported spending much less than the spending limits.

Under current election rules, candidates for president and vice president may spend P10 per voter. With 55.7 million registered voters, including overseas voters, these candidates may incur maximum expenses of P557 million. Candidates for senator with political parties may spend P3 per voter or a total limit of P167 million. Those without political parties may spend P5 per voter or a total limit of P278 million.

By design, the advertising contracts submitted by media outfits should provide additional information to verify and validate the SOCEs of the candidates.

Curiously, most of the candidates reported higher amounts for political-ads spending compared with the consolidated advertising contracts submitted by the media outfits.

Among the few exceptions, however, are senatorial candidates Cresente Paez and Samuel Pagdilao, Sen. Ralph Recto, and Makabayang Koalisyon ng Mamamayan or Makabayan, the party that fielded senatorial bet Neri Colmenares, who in turn reported smaller amounts than what appeared in receipted advertising contracts.

Then there were cases in which PCIJ was unable to verify political-ad spending because the candidate did not submit a SOCE – as in the case of former Pampanga Governor Mark Lapid and veteran senator Sergio Osmeña III.

But if receipted ad contracts are considered, Osmeña would end up as having spent P78 million. Lapid, meanwhile, had all his pol ads worth P3.9 million paid for by Aksyon Demokratiko. (Both Osmeña and Lapid lost in the senatorial race, incidentally.)

The Nationalist People’s Coalition, for its part, seemed to be in another category altogether, declaring zero amounts in its party SOCE, yet providing a breakdown of expenditures in its Summary Report of Lawful Expenditures or SLE.

Party benefits

By Comelec’s campaign-finance rules, political parties may also spend for candidates they fielded, with a maximum of P5 per voter. For the 2016 elections, the spending cap for political parties was set at around P279 million each.

Among the political parties, the Liberal Party showed greatest disparity between its declared pol-ad spending and receipted ad contracts. It declared pol ads worth P210 million even as its receipted ad contracts amounted to only P90 million. This benefitted Roxas and tandem ads for Roxas and Robredo.

As for PDP-Laban, Duterte’s adoptive party, it declared P129 million worth of political ads even though its receipted ad contracts amounted to only P62 million – all benefitting Duterte.

Some candidates reported little pol-ad spending, though, by maximizing their being the head or leader of their respective political parties. This was the case at least for the late Senator Santiago with the People’s Reform Party and Ferdinand Martin Romualdez with Lakas-CMD.

Admittedly, however, confusion can arise over who should declare the expenditure for the political ads: the candidate or the party? In the case of Santiago, the party and the candidate declared the same amount in their separate SOCEs: P70 million. Receipted ad contracts, however, state only P36 million for PRP and P2 million for Santiago.

But Gordon’s case takes the cake in terms of strangeness. All the receipted ad contracts were paid for by Bagumbayan Volunteers and not a single contract reflected Gordon as payor of the ad. In his SOCE, however, Gordon declared P114 million worth of pol-ad spending.

Comelec records show Gordon as having run as an independent candidate. As for Bagumbayan Volunteers, the Comelec’s CFO says that while it is an accredited political party, it did not field a candidate in the 2016 elections.

Can’t donate but did

In the meantime, several business entities seem oblivious to the ban on companies donating to election campaigns. While moves are under way in Congress to amend the Omnibus Election Code, particularly to allow such donations, the prohibition remains in effect.

Section 36 of Batas Pambansa 68 or the Corporation Code of the Philippines prohibits corporations, domestic or foreign, from giving donations in aid of any political party or candidate for purposes of partisan political activity. It penalizes violators a fine of P1,000 to P30,000 or imprisonment of 30 days to five years or both plus dissolution proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

As well, Section 95 of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits certain types of corporations from donating to any political party or candidate such as financial institutions and corporations with government contracts, among others. Its violation constitutes an election offense and violators may face jail terms of one to six years, without probation. Violation of this rule is also a ground for disqualification of the recipient of the donation.

Despite this, Bansa Tri-Media Corporation, an SEC-registered company but whose Facebook page has only three likers/followers and no zero posts, donated some P3.2 million worth of pol ads to Duterte, based on a receipted ad contract submitted by GMA Network, Inc. The file, however, did not include a certificate of acceptance of the donation by Duterte; Duterte himself did not list Bansa Tri-Media Corporation as one of his donors.

Patriot Freedom Air, Inc. also paid for P24.3 million worth of pol ads for senatorial bet Francis Tolentino. In his SOCE, Tolentino listed three persons donating to his campaign coffers through Patriot Freedom Air, Inc. The total amount of their donations, based on Tolentino’s SOCE, amounted to only P22.4 million. Patriot Freedom Air, Inc. does not appear in the registered companies under SEC.

No more ‘Friends’

In its series of orientation forums for various stakeholders, including the candidates and their parties, the Comelec CFO staff reiterated that Section 98 of the Omnibus Election Code requires the true names of campaign contributors.

The Code states: “No person shall make any contribution in any name except his own nor shall any candidate or treasurer of a political party receive a contribution or enter or record the same in any name other than that of the person by whom it was actually made.”

“Friends,” therefore, are no longer legitimate donors.

But “Friends of Risa Hontiveros” donated P236,000 worth of pol ads to Hontiveros, who did not acknowledge any “Friends” in her SOCE.

“Friends of VP Binay” — also known as AgriPartylist, Bataan ads, Bicol ads, FILCABS, and Sorsogon ads — was written in advertising receipts as payors of P250,000 worth of pol ads of Jojo Binay. But Binay did not acknowledge these “Friends” as contributors in his SOCE.

The other pol ads donors who were not declared, or whose donations were under-declared, in the Summary of Contributions Received (SCR) submitted by their candidates are:

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— With research and reporting by Malou Mangahas, and additional research by Fern Felix, Davinci Maru, Vino Lucero, Ana Ysabel Manalang, Jil Danielle Caro, and Steffi Mari Sanchez, PCIJ, August 2017

Some 50 TV, radio, print outfits did not submit all pol ads docs?

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SOME CANDIDATES may have willfully mocked their lawful duty to file election-spending reports with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) but they are not the only ones who did so. Like these wayward candidates, many media agencies also failed to file reports with the poll body, in defiance of their obligation in law.

This is even though television networks, radio stations, and print-media agencies emerged as the biggest winners, money-wise, in last year’s elections: From political-ad spending by some 50 national candidates and their parties alone, these media agencies scooped a whale of a windfall — about P5.4 billion

Put another way, this means that on average, for every P100 they spent, these candidates plunked down P92 to prime, preen, and promise the moon and the stars in political ads.

And yet according to Comelec records, a significant number of media outfits did not submit a single document related to political ads that they had published or aired, and for which they received hefty sums from the candidates and the political parties.

PCIJ obtained from Comelec’s Campaign Finance Office (CFO) copies of ad contracts submitted by media agencies to the Commission from April to September last year. PCIJ then compared these contracts and Nielsen Media’s monitoring reports on ads that were actually aired and published during the 90-day campaign period for the May 2016 elections.

A review of these documents indicated that 55 media agencies — two TV stations, 15 newspapers, and 38 radio stations – may have failed to comply with their reporting duty under campaign-finance rules. The review does not yet include the agencies that placed four outdoor advertisements that Nielsen Media monitored in four different locations.

Surprisingly, the media nonfilers included the government-run People’s Television 4 or PTV 4.

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A serious matter

To Efraim Bag-id, acting head of the Comelec CFO, such acts of omission by media agencies are a serious matter.

Failure to file advertising contracts and receipts covering political-ad buys by the candidates and political parties in TV, radio, and print-media outfits constitutes an election offense under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Elections Act. For this offense, media-agency owners and executives could be held liable and sent to jail. Comelec Resolution No. 9991 or the Campaign Finance and Disclosure Policy states that advertising contracts should be submitted to the poll body within five days after these are signed, and accompanied by a Summary Report of Advertising Contracts (SAC).

Based on Nielsen Media reports, the nonfiling of these documents by some media agencies involved in the 2016 election campaign translates to unreported political ads totaling at least P570 million in value, with radio ads having the largest share: P522 million. Next come print ads, (P26 million), then those on TV (P16 million), and last outdoor ads (P6.6 million).

In 2010, PCIJ published a report on political ads that identified almost the same set of media outfits as non-compliant with their reporting duties under campaign-finance rules.

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Inquiry letters

To verify the data it gathered, PCIJ sent inquiry letters to some of the companies that appeared to be noncompliant in 2016, in particular those that aired or ran ads worth at least P10 million.

Among these companies was the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), which was very quick to reply. PDI General Counsel Rudyard Arbolado said, however, that the popular media outfit was puzzled over its inclusion in the noncompliant list.

PDI then showed PCIJ copies of ad contracts that the newspaper submitted to the Comelec’s CFO and which were marked “Received” by Comelec personnel. All of the contracts were not among Comelec’s compilation of submitted ad contracts seen and reviewed by PCIJ.

According to PDI’s records, these are the newspaper’s submissions to Comelec last year:

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CNN Philippines also replied swiftly, refuting PCIJ’s findings. CNN Marketing Manager Yna Ellorda even shared with PCIJ a copy of the document it submitted. The papers, however, showed that it was submitted to, and received by, the Education and Information Department (EID) of Comelec.

Upon a quick check of CFO records, Bag-id confirmed that the office had received documents from PDI, albeit with dates that did not match those in PDI’s records: March 17, April 7, April 27, and June 2. He also confirmed that the EID forwarded CNN’s submission and was received by the CFO on May 26 last year.

Bag-id said as well that the CFO staff has yet to review the advertising contracts submitted to the office. He conceded that it was possible that not all of the documents it received were made available to PCIJ.

The Philippine Star, for its part, recently acknowledged receipt of PCIJ’s query letters and follow-up, which were sent last July 6 and July 11 respectively. It has yet to send a formal reply to the Center’s queries, however.

Radio Mindanao Network (17 stations and three affiliated stations) and Tiger 22 Media Corporation (five stations) also acknowledged receipt of PCIJ’s inquiry letter, but have yet to send their respective responses to the questions.

Missing 15 percent?

For sure, though, the non-compliance of some media outfits with the requirement for them to submit reports on the political ads they ran can complicate attempts to calculate just how much commissions had been collected by the ad agencies that handled them for the candidates and the political parties.

Media outfits follow a formula for commissions on ad placements, depending on whether the ads were placed directly or through advertising agencies.

For ads placed through advertising agencies, it is:
Base Rate – Agency Commission + VAT – Withholding Tax = Amount payable to media outfit

For direct accounts, the formula is:
Base Rate + VAT – Withholding Tax = Amount payable to media outfit

Based on just the submitted ad contracts, the ad agencies involved would have received at least P361 million worth of commission altogether.

Then again, even the ad contracts submitted to Comelec pose problems for those trying to figure out the total commissions the ad agencies got, because of inconsistencies in reporting.

Some ad contracts, for instance, do not indicate how much commission went to the ad agency.

Some reflect the amount of the commission, but do not indicate the ad agency or there are no attached telecast or broadcast order to indicate the agency.

Some indicate that the advertisement was placed directly by the candidate but, just the same, reflect a commission amount.

Other figures do not tally as well across related documents. From advertising contracts to official receipts, to telecast or broadcast orders, values vary even for the same ads.

Comelec CFO Acting Head Efraim Bag-id says that receipts should be the basis to determine official amounts in ad-contract submissions. But then some of the ad contracts submitted by media agencies lack official receipts. There are also cases in which the same receipt was used to cover different ad contracts.

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PCIJ thus decided to write to three advertising agencies, again targeting in particular those that appeared to have received commissions worth at least P10 million, to clear some details.

Only one ad firm replied, however, and that was also only after a follow-up call was made: Media Market Lab Advertising, which had at least one vice presidential candidate and three senatoriables as clients, for whose ads it earned almost P47 million in commissions – at least according to ad-contract submissions to Comelec.

But according to Managing Director Emma Sierra, Media Market Lab received less than the computed P46.9 million in commission that the agency reportedly received from ad placements for its clients who were national candidates in May 2016.

When asked whether the firm’s profit as an ad agent in the 2016 elections was reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Sierra replied, “Nag-submit naman kami sa RCF ng report. May mga resibo ‘yun (We submitted a report to RCF. That was with receipts).”

Sierra was not sure though what “RCF” meant. The RCF or the Report of Contractors and Business Firms is actually the form to be submitted by every person or firm to whom any electoral expenditure has been made. This is stated in Rule 11 of the Omnibus Rules on Campaign Finance, which also says that the RCF has to be filed within 30 days after the conduct of the election with the CFO of the nearest Comelec Field Office.

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— With research by Fern Felix, Davinci Maru, Vino Lucero, Ana Isabel Manalang, Jil Danielle Caro, Steffi Mari Sanchez, and Malou Mangahas, PCIJ, August 2017

Spotlight on Agriculture

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Philippine crop production volumes, from 1993 to 2015.

Philippine crop production volumes, from 1993 to 2015.

AS OF the latest official census in 2015, there are now a total of 100.98 million Filipinos. One in every three lives, works, and draws sustenance from agriculture.

The agriculture sector consists of four sub-sectors: farming, fisheries, livestock, and forestry, which altogether by the year 2000 employed 39.8 percent of the labor force. Yet still, farmers and fisherfolk remain the most impoverished in the country.

In 2015, land planted to at least 21 various agricultural crops covered 13 million hectares. In order of scale, palay, coconut, and corn are the crops with the largest land coverage.

Agricultural area planted to various crops, from 1993 to 2015.

Agricultural area planted to various crops, from 1993 to 2015.

In terms of harvest volume, however, sugarcane production that ranges from 17 to 29 million metric tons per year outranked all other crops.

The yield from sugarcane plantations represents about a third of the total 84 million metric tons of crops that the agriculture sector produced in 2015. The situation derives from the intermittent but significant rise and fall in rice and corn production, as well as that of 14 other agricultural crops, over the last two decades.

Sixteen major crops produced by the agriculture sector have marked production slips and upticks, often on account of disastrous weather systems, through the years.

Philippine rice production volume, 1998 to 2016.

Philippine rice production volume, 1998 to 2016.

In 1998, palay production severely dropped by 24 percent from the previous year, while that of sugarcane and coconut, by 22 and 12 percent, respectively. The situation would repeat in 2010 when the production volumes of major crops also declined significantly. In both years, super typhoons destroyed wide swaths of agricultural lands.

Philippine corn production volume, 1998 to 2016.

Philippine corn production volume, 1998 to 2016.

But did you know that apart from rice, coconut, corn, and sugarcane, our farmers also grow smaller volumes of other crops? Filipino farmers also harvest bananas, pineapple, coffee, mango, tobacco, abaca, rubber, cassava, camote, peanut, mongo, onion, garlic, tomato, eggplant, cabbage, calamansi, and other crops.

Check out the backstory and future links in data and statistics of the Philippine agriculture sector on PCIJ’s MoneyPolitics Online!

Ang Mga Wika ng Pilipinas

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“ANG TINATAWAG na ‘mga wika ng Filipinas’ ay ang iba’t ibang wikang katutubo na sinasalita sa buong kapuluan. Hindi tiyak ang bilang ng mga ito, ngunit may nagsasabing 86 at may nagsasabing 170. Itinuturing ang bawat isa na wika (language sa Ingles) dahil hindi magkakaintindihan ang dalawang tagapagsalita nitó na may magkaibang katutubong wika…”
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(PCIJ Note: Teksto halaw sa “Madalas Itanong Hinggil sa Wikang Pambansa (Frequently Asked Questions on the National Language)” na akda ni Virgilio S. Almario* at Salin sa Ingles ni Marne L. Kilates; at impormasyon mula sa Census of Population and Housing, Philippine Statistics Authority, at Komisyon sa Wikang Filipino.)
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Mga Pangunahing Wika sa Iba't-Ibang Rehiyon ng Pilipinas

Mga Pangunahing Wika sa Iba’t-Ibang Rehiyon ng Pilipinas

MGA DIYALEKTO
“Bawat isa sa mga wika ay may mga sanga at tinatawag na mga diyalekto na maaaring magkaiba sa isa’t isa sa ilang katangian. Ngunit nagkakaintindihan ang dalawang tagapagsalita na may magkaibang diyalekto…”

WIKANG KATUTUBO
“Dapat tandaan, ang itinuturing na ‘wikang katutubo’ ay alinman sa mga wika na sinúso ng isang tao na ang mga magulang ay may angkang katutubo sa Filipinas. Kabílang sa wikang katutubo ang pangunahing gaya ng Tagalog o Waray o ang maliit na gaya ng Higaonon o Ivatan. Kahit maraming nagsasalita ngayong mamamayan ng Filipinas ay hindi maituturing na wikang katutubo ang Tsino o kahit ang Ingles.”

Ang Kasaysayan ng Wikang Filipino

Ang Kasaysayan ng Wikang Filipino

MGA PANGUNAHING WIKA NG PILIPINAS
“Tradisyonal na tinatawag na walong pangunahing wika ng bansa ang Bikol, Ilokano, Hiligaynon, Pampanggo, Pangasinan, Sebwano, Tagalog, at Waray (Samar-Leyte). Malimit ding tawagin ang mga ito na wikang rehiyonal. May pagkakataóng isinasáma sa pangkat ang Mëranaw, Tausug, at Magindanaw. Ang karaniwang katwiran sa “pangunahing wika” ay dahil (1) may malaking bílang ito ng tagapagsalita, karaniwang umaabot sa isang milyon ang tagapagsalita, o (2) may mahalagang tungkulin ito sa bansa bílang wika ng pagtuturo, bílang wikang opisyal, o bílang wikang pambansa.”

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* Si Virgilio Almario, mas kilala sa taguring “Rio Alma”, ay isang Pambansang Alagad ng Sining sa Literatura (National Artist for Literature), makata, literary historian, kritiko, at tagapagsalin ng mga tula, dula at nobela, lalo na ng mga akda ni Jose Rizal. Siya nagayon ang tagapangulo ng Komisyon sa Wikang Filipino.


Sad stats on women and children

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Filipino women in especially difficult circumstances, 2000 to 2015.

Filipino women in especially difficult circumstances, 2000 to 2015.

THE MAGNA CARTA OF WOMEN, or Republic Act No. 9710, passed into law on August 14, 2009, or over eight years ago. It affirmed the role of women in nation-building, assured the “substantive equality” of women and men, and declared as state policies the empowerment of women, providing them equal access to resources and development results and outcome.

Most important of all, the law acknowledged that the “equality of men and women entails to abolition of the unequal structures and practices that perpetuate discrimination and inequality.”

Affirming that “women’s rights (are) human rights”, the law committed the state to ‘intensify its efforts to fulfill its duties under international and domestic law to recognize, respect, protect, fulfill, and promote all human rights and fundamental freedoms of women, especially marginalized women, in the economic, social, cultural, and other fields without distinction or discrimination on account of class, age, sex, gender, language, ethnicity, religion, ideology, disability, education, and status.

In the Philippines, the adage that women hold half the sky rings true. As of the 2015 national census, half the population, or 49.54 percent of the 100,981,437 total Filipinos, are women.

Yet still, data from the Philippine Statistics Authority showed that in 2015, despite an array of laws on the protection of their rights and welfare, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) in 2015 served or assisted over 150,000 women in especially difficult circumstances (WEDC).

Female child victims of exploitation. trafficking, sexual abuse, and other crimes, 2004 to 2015.

Female child victims of exploitation. trafficking, sexual abuse, and other crimes, 2004 to 2015.

This number excludes as yet possibly bigger numbers of women victimized by physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, and trafficking, among other adverse situations, who have had to suffer in silence and solitude, for lack of access to state assistance.

The term Women in Especially Difficult Circumstances or WEDC refers to “victims and survivors of sexual and physical abuse, illegal recruitment, prostitution, trafficking, armed conflict, women in detention, victims and survivors of rape and incest, and such other related circumstances which have incapacitated them functionally,” according to Magna Carta of Women.

A mixed picture has emerged. In 2000, DSWD reported a substantial decline in cases of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse it has assisted, but also an unrelenting increase in cases of trafficking victimizing women.

Male child victims of trafficking, sexual abuse, involved in armed conflict, etc., 2004 to 2015.

Male child victims of trafficking, sexual abuse, involved in armed conflict, etc., 2004 to 2015.

Other than the women, female and male children have also fallen victim to abuse and exploitation. Over the last decade, the DSWD’s workload has been dominated by cases of children who had been abandoned, neglected, sexually abused; dragged into prostitution, pornography, child labor, and illegal recruitment; or even engaged in and displaced by armed conflict.

Yet again, a mixed picture of progress and regress is unfolding. More and more Filipino girls are falling prey to trafficking and cyber pornography operators since 2004. Cases of Filipino boys being abandoned and neglected have decreased in numbers.

Social welfare facilities in the Philippines for women, children, and the elderly, 1994 to 2015.

Social welfare facilities in the Philippines for women, children, and the elderly, 1994 to 2015.

By 2015, the DSWD said there were 71 facilities, public and private, catering to the social needs of children, youth, WEDC, disabled, and elderly.

Have we done right and enough for our women and children?

Check out Social Services data from 2004 to 2015 in PCIJ’s MoneyPolitics Online.

Unexplained wealth, redacted?

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TO REDACT or not to redact.

Which could avoid or attract scrutiny and censure?

Redactions are not the only issue that could arise if public officials would shade or black out the true, detailed, and complete facts of their wealth.

Big and small discrepancies in the content of SALNs they have filed across periods of time could trigger more serious questions. Unexplained wealth, for one.

PCIJ has secured the SALNs that most of the same Cabinet members had filed as of June 30, 2016 — whence they entered public service as Duterte’s appointees. These had not been redacted at all.

Next came the SALNs they filed as of December 2016 that were shotful of shaded or blacked-out items, thus showing only the sums of their assets, liabilities, and net worth.

Net worth rise

But a comparison of the sums alone showed multimillion-peso increases in the net worth that certain Cabinet secretaries had declared, across the six-month interval between June 30 and December 31, 2016.

How they managed to do that, despite modest lawful incomes in government, and rules on conflict of interest that bar them from earning fat sums outside of public service, is the big mystery.

Without any clear explanation offered by the redacted SALNs, such significant upticks in net worth constitute unexplained wealth per se or by itself, according to lawyers of the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman.

By PCIJ’s review, the SALNs without redactions and with redactions of 10 Cabinet secretaries showed net-worth increases of P100,000 to nearly P30 million across the six-month period:

• A hefty P29,753,018-increase — or about P5 million a month — in the net worth of Finance Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez, or from P322,106,265 in June 2016 to P351,859,283 in December 2016.

• A P9,906,155-increase in the net worth of Economic Planning Secretary Ernesto M. Pernia, or from P95,525,450 in July 2016 to P105,431,605.52 in December 2016.

• A P5.225-million increase in the net worth of Presidential Communications Operations Office Secretary Martin Andanar, or from P147,047,869.19 in June 2016 to P152,272,523.19, as of December 2016;

• A P4,673,599-increase in the net worth of Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Jesus Dureza, or from P35,371,280.95 in June 2016 to P40,044,880.07 in December 2016.

• A P1.9-million increase in the net worth of Transportation Secretary Arthur P. Tugade, or from 300,069,263 in June 2016 to P301,999,204.00 in December 2016.

• A P1.6-million increase in the net worth of Energy Secretary Alfonso Cusi, or from P161,089,000 in July 2016 to P162,701,642 in December 2016.

• A P1.56-million increase in the net worth of Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno, or from P18,254,429 in June 2016 to P19,814,429.00 in December 2016.

• A lean P100,000 increase in the net worth of National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon, or from P22,145,000 in June 2016 to P22,245,000 in December 2016.

Salalima’s net dips

In contrast, newly resigned Information and Communications Technology Secretary Rodolfo Salima, who was a telco executive for a long time, showed an unexplained decline in wealth from June to December 2016. He entered public service with a net worth of P311,370,739.26, but this dipped to P304,961,439.91 by December 2016, a decrease of P6,409,299.

Public Works and Highways Secretary Mark Villar, the wealthiest of the Duterte Cabinet members, declared a net worth of P1.41-billion in his December 2016 SALN. Only these sums of his SALN entries have not been redacted: P134.9-million in real properties, P1.29-billion in “other real and personal properties”; and liabilities of only P14.5 million.

An uptick in the net worth of two other secretaries occurred over longer periods of time.

Across a seven-year period, a fantastic P21,956,632.23-increase was recorded in the net worth of Agriculture Secretary Emmanuel Piñol, or from P3,643,000 in the SALN he filed as of Dec. 31, 2009, to P25,599,632.23 in his latest SALN as of Dec. 31, 2016.

PCIJ also noted a modest P2,650,000-increase in the net worth of Labor Secretary Silvestre Bello III, or from P12,800,000 in the SALN he filed as of December 2008 to P15,450,000 in his latest SALN as of December 2016.

Both Piñol and Bello are allies of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Both skipped public service for some years, hence PCIJ has no SALN copies for them in the intervening years.

Dominguez’s dough

The rise and fall of the values enrolled in the redacted and unredacted SALNs are rather difficult to track. This much is true in the case of Finance Secretary Dominguez, whose SALNs for June 2016 and December 2016 showed the largest net increase.

In both SALNs, he declared zero liabilities but also an identical list of real assets, personal and other properties, and slight changes in the entities in which he has business interests and financial connections.

Dominguez declared the same list of nine residential, agricultural, and commercial real properties that he acquired or inherited but marked a P5.5-million increase in their combined values. He said that he had real assets in Davao del Sur; Davao City; Tuguegarao, Cagayan; Sta. Maria, Bulacan; and one in Portland, Oregon, U.S.A. that he reportedly acquired in 2001 at a cost of P51,975,720, as of his June 2016 SALN.

Dominguez also declared three categories of “personal and other properties,” notably cash and financial instruments; jewelry, art, vehicles, and other collectibles; and shares of stocks and advances. Altogether, he said that his personal and other assets grew in value from P270.03 million as of June 2016, to a redacted, hence secret, amount in December 2016.

Dominguez said that from 1983 to 2016, he has had business interests and financial connections in 26 entities (as of June 2016), and in 27 entities (as of December 2016), with at most two entities dropped or added in each.

In four, he said that he serves as shareholder, director, and treasurer; in three others as shareholder and advancer; in three more as member; and one each for “shareholder, director, and advancer,” advancer, beneficial owner, director, and preferred shareholder. For the other 12 entities, Dominguez said that he serves as shareholder.

Aguirre’s kin

Justice Secretary Vitaliano Aguirre II, meanwhile, declared a net worth of P37,632,069.77 as of December 2016, but PCIJ has not received from Malacañang a copy of his June 2016 SALN.

Aguirre’s filing stands out for the number of his relatives in government: 13 in all, including the Mayor and a councilor in Mulanay, Quezon. He has a sister working as an election officer in Mauban, Quezon; another sister, a sister-in-law, five first cousins, and a niece all working in Mulanay town; two first cousins-in-law and an aunt employed in three other Quezon towns; and a bilas or in-law, Victor Uy, who works as his executive assistant at the Justice department.

President Rodrigo R. Duterte, in his SALNs that enroll just one data field redacted in each — his home address — showed a P3.4-million increase in his net worth, or from P24,080,094.04 in June 2016 to P27,428,862.44 in December 2016.

PCIJ obtained copies of Duterte’s SALNs from the Office of the Ombudsman, hence its singular redacted data entry. — PCIJ, September 2017

SALNs to impeach CJ, other execs but Palace redacts Cabinet SALNs

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Slide1

A CHIEF JUSTICE was impeached in 2012 for failure to declare the true and detailed list of condo units he owned, and pesos and dollars he had in banks.

Ten years prior, a President was forced out of the Palace for collecting millions in kickbacks and commissions from state contracts and excise taxes, as well as for building scandalously opulent mansions for his mistresses. He, too, kept hidden the facts of his wealth, and would be exposed later to have used a fake name to open a fat bank account.

Fast forward to today: The allies of President Rodrigo R. Duterte in the House of Representatives recently endorsed an impeachment complaint against another chief justice. She, too, the complainant averred, did not enroll the true and complete details of multimillion pesos in fees she received as a co-counsel in the government’s case against a multinational contractor, before she was appointed top jurist in August 2012.

Threat of impeachment lurked as well for the chairman of the Commission on Elections, who, by his estranged wife’s claims, did not report multimillion pesos he has raised from a currency trading business. (The Ombudsman has also been named as a target for impeachment for other reasons, however.)

In all these cases gone, going, or coming still, a four-letter acronym of a document has served as the top trigger: SALN, or the Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth that all public officials and employees must file upon entry into public service, every year before the April 30 deadline, and upon exit from office.

Download (PDF, 121KB)

What to redact, why?

Yet now the Cabinet members of the Duterte administration and data-privacy officers in state agencies seem to want to keep under lock and key the most important details of their wealth.

Last Aug. 16, the Malacañang Records Office (MRO) released to data journalists of Entrepreneur Philippines — an online business news and features web site under Summit Media — copies of the SALNs of 28 Cabinet members appointed by Duterte administration. The SALNs provided were invariably outstanding for the details they blacked out, than for the details that they revealed, or must reveal, according to guidelines of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

It is not clear whether some or all of the redactions on these SALNs were made on request of the filers — the Cabinet members — or on decision of the personnel of MRO, Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO), and Office of the President who have been designated as “data privacy officers” of their agencies. The latter — supposedly called “the Clearinghouse of the OP Family” — made the actual redactions.

They supposedly want to protect the “right to security and privacy” of the Cabinet members, citing as basis the Data Privacy Act or Republic Act No. 10173. But then they seem impervious to the fact that the redactions are clear violations — even an act of “repeal by implication” — of The SALN Law or Republic Act No. 6713, which upholds and the principles of transparency and accountability in public service.

PCOO Assistant Secretary Kris Ablan told PCIJ though that some secretaries, including his boss, Communications Secretary Martin Andanar, had expressed concern that certain data in the SALN could invite malefactors to harass the filers or their family members.

Right to security, privacy?

Multiple redactions had been made in fact on the SALNs that Malacañang released to journalists last August 16. Days earlier on Aug. 4, Ablan wrote Chairman Raymund E. Liboro of the National Privacy Commission requesting “clarification on the disclosure of information in relation to the sworn (SALN) of government officials.”

In it, Ablan said that he was writing on behalf of the PCOO, the Office of the President, the Office of the Cabinet Secretary, and the Presidential Management Staff. Altogether, these agencies make up what Ablan told the PCIJ is called “the Clearinghouse of the OP Family.”

Ablan wrote the NPC: “Pursuant to Executive Order No. 2, s. 2016 or the Freedom of Information in the Executive Branch, all public officials are reminded to make their SALNs available for scrutiny, in accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations. However, we have received valid security concerns during our inter-agency meeting on the disclosure of information in the SALNs of government officials to the public.

“To balance the right to information of the citizenry and the right to security and privacy of government officials,” Ablan sought an “advisory” from Liboro’s NPC on “Remarks/Recommendations” of the OP Family Clearinghouse to withhold dozens of data that the law and the CSC guidelines prescribe must be disclosed the SALN.

Then again, clear answers to the query and the NPC advisory would come post-facto, or a month after the MRO had already made redactions on the SALNs of Cabinet members that it sent out to the media.

Download (PDF, 1.19MB)

More redactions

In his request letter for an NPC advisory, Ablan said the data that the OP Family Clearinghouse had wanted NPC to approve on grounds of “the right to security and privacy”. Ablan’s letter also had offered “Remarks/Recommendation that the OP Family wants NPC to approve. These include:

“Family and Home Address; Name of Spouse including Agency/Office; Office Address and Position; Name of minor children. Remarks/Recommendations: Disclosure of this information may expose the Official’s family to violence and harassment, especially for officers in law enforcement.

“Exact location of real properties, Transfer Certificate of Title {TCT) No., and plate number of vehicles. Remarks/Recommendations: We propose to redact the exact address and the TCT No., and only disclose the barangay and city/municipality where the property is located including the type description, kind, assessed value, current fair market value, acquisition year, mode of acquisition and acquisition cost. Further, we propose to redact the plate number and conduction number of the vehicle/s for security reason.

“Business interests and financial connections. Remarks/Recommendations: “We propose that the exact address and name of the business shall be redacted to avoid harassment and disclose only general information related to business interest and financial connections of the declarant.

“ID number and signature: Request/Recommendation: “We propose to redact these information, which form part of sensitive personal information under the Data Privacy Act of 2012.”

Meetings with PCIJ

PCIJ registered its opposition to the redactions made on the SALNs of the Cabinet members with NPC’s Liboro and with Ablan — whose team of three persons had diligently monitored implementation of President Duterte’s Executive Order No. 2 that instituted a Freedom of Information policy in the Executive Branch.

Three meetings with PCIJ, the NPC and the OP Family Clearinghouse officers and lawyers held in recent weeks revealed, among others, that the latter seemed oblivious to the fact that it is not the Data Privacy Act (Republic Act No. 10173) that should apply in the situation.

Instead, it is Republic Act No. 6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, or by shorthand, The SALN Law, that should be the reference in the filing of SALNs.

Too, the meetings clarified that it is not the National Privacy Commission but the Civil Service Commission that is the chief enforcer of guidelines on the proper filing of SALNs, and of the constitutional and statutory provisions on public disclosure.

SALN, why, how, where, when to file. Ombudsman ppt

Deal-breaker for FOI EO

On advise of lawyers, and from interviews with CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman, PCIJ informed Ablan and the NPC that the redactions made might have resulted in “defacing” public documents on multiple counts, and constituted a “repeal by implication” of the SALN law.

Because they mock the authenticity of the FOI EO that the Duterte administration had issued in July 2016, PCIJ told the NPC and the OP Family Clearinghouse that the redactions are a clear deal-breaker for the CSOs that had been engaged in pushing the bounds of the FOI executive order.

To be sure, if only the OP Family Clearinghouse had checked out the relevant laws, the redactions should not have been made in the first place.

CSC guidelines

Under circulars it issued in 2011, 2013, and 2016 on the filing of SALNs, the CSC had prescribed more than explicitly that the SALN “should state true and complete declaration of assets, liabilities and net worth, including disclosure of business interests and financial connections of the declarant.”

In 2013 the CSC said that while the declarant shall provide information on his/her address, “whenever a third party request for a copy of the SALN…the agency has the option to shade the declarant’s address for purposes of security.” In short, there is only a conditional authority from CSC for repository agencies to redact just one and only one information in the SALN — the filer’s address.

The 2011 guidelines of the CSC spelled out that:

• “On ASSETS. Assets including those within or outside of the Philippines, whether real or personal, should be declared as well as description of real properties as to the kind, nature, exact location, acquisition mode and year, assessed value, fair market value, acquisition cost of land and/or building, including improvements made.

• “Assets whether tangible (i.e. cash on hand, cars, appliances, jewelry, mobile phones) or intangible such as stocks, bond certificates, and the like, denominated in foreign currency shall be converted into the corresponding Philippine currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing as of 31 December of the preceding calendar year.

• “On LIABILITIES. Nature of liability and name of creditors should be indicated. The declarant must disclose the outstanding balance as of 31 December of the preceding calendar year.

• “Disclosure of ALL sources of gross income. For both single and joint filing, declarant must disclose all sources of income whether derived from practice of profession, business, and the like for the preceding calendar year.

• “Declaring of Personal and Family Expenses. A new feature of the revised SALN form is the disclosure of the estimated amount of the declarant’s personal and family expenses. In case of joint filing, the declarant and his/her spouse shall declare the estimated amount of their personal and family expenses for the preceding calendar year.”

It must be noted though that the last two provisions cited here from the 2011 CSC guidelines were later removed by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 5, series of 2012/Resolution No. 1200480, after several government agencies raised concerns about the 2011 SALN format.

In 2015, the CSC again instituted a new SALN form. This was followed by the 2016 guidelines that, apart from requiring its use across all agencies, further clarified that:

• “In the declaration of real properties, the form requires the exact location of the property.

• “The Value and the Current Fair Market Value should be based on what is stated in the Tax Declaration of Real Property.

• “The identification of relatives is required to be ‘to the best of my knowledge.’

• “All other declarations are required to be ‘true and detailed.’

• “In case of joint filing, all real and personal properties shall be declared including their respective paraphernalia and capital properties, if there are any.

• “Mortgaged properties are already under the name of the declarant. Hence, the mortgaged properties shall be declared either under real or personal properties. The acquisition cost to be declared shall be the actual purchase price. However, the declarant should declare the outstanding balance of the mortgage loan as of December 31 of the preceding year under Liabilities.

• “Insurance properties should be declared under personal properties. The amount to be disclosed under acquisition cost shall be the amount already paid.

• “Pensions received for the year of declaration should be declared as personal property either cash on hand or cash in bank, as the case may be.

• “Shares of stock are personal properties that must be declared. The acquisition cost shall be the total value of the shares of stocks as of December 31 of the preceding year.

• “Earnings and income from other sources must be declared as these either form part of the declarant’s cash on hand or in bank, which shall be determined as of December 31 of the preceding year.

• “Inherited properties are transferred to the heirs by operation of law. Hence, even without a transfer of the property under the name of the declarant, the latter shall declare his/her share in the inherited properties as his/her assets. For the acquisition cost, the declarant shall state zero (0). For real properties inherited, the declarant is required to provide the assessed value and current fair market value found in the tax declaration of the real properties concerned.

• “Minimal valued properties collectively must be declared, according to the nature/kind of the personal property like books; and the declarant may use “various years” as year acquired “in group/bulk.” R.A. No. 6713 does not provide for a ceiling on properties to be declared.

• “The outstanding balance of liabilities as of December 31 of the preceding year shall be declared, including personal loans and the names of creditors.

• “Business interests refer to declarant’s existing interest in any business enterprise or entity, aside from his/her income from government while financial connections refer to declarant’s existing connections with any business enterprise or entity, whether as a consultant, adviser and the like, with an expectation of remuneration for services rendered.

• “Relatives in the first degree of consanguinity include the declarant’s father, mother, son and daughter. Relatives in the first degree of affinity include the declarant’s father-in-law and mother- in-law.

• “Relatives in the second degree of consanguinity include the declarant’s brother, sister, grandmother, grandfather, grandson and granddaughter. Relatives in the second degree of affinity include the declarant’s brother-in-law, sister-in-law, grandmother-in-law, grandfather-in-law, granddaughter-in-law and grandson-in-law.

• “Relatives in the third degree of consanguinity include the declarant’s nephew, niece, uncle and aunt. Relatives in the third degree of affinity include declarant’s nephew-in-law, niece-in-law, uncle- in-law, auntie-in-law.

• “Relatives in the fourth degree of consanguinity include the declarant’s first cousin.”

Pushback from e-SALN?

The Office of the Ombudsman, meanwhile, had even launched last year the pilot run of its e-SALN project, which would usher in the electronic filing of SALNs with over a million public officials and employees as targeted filers.

The SALN template has been coded under the e-SALN project, and its full rollout is expected to take a few more years. The matter of digital signature, and minor tweaks to the coded template are now being addressed.

Recently, Deputy Ombudsman Cyril Ramos, project head, had stressed in a public presentation that the filing of “true and detailed” SALNs by all public officials and employees upholds the principles of transparency and accountability in public service.

Ramos said the SALN serves as “an initiatory tool, a wealth-tracker document” in discerning:

“Public Accountability, as the fundamental laws in which the system is rooted invariably emphasize upholding the time-honored principle that public office is a public trust;

“Conflict of Interest Control, as can be construed from the disclosure requirement of business interest and financial connection including naming and identifying relatives in the government; and

“Wealth Monitoring, as asset disclosure is currently being employed as a tool for detecting possible cases of misuse of public office for self-enrichment.”

The Ombudsman's e-SALN project

First massive redaction

By the reckoning of both the Ombudsman and the CSC, this is the first time that multiple redactions on the SALNs of Cabinet members had been made. The SALNs of Duterte, the senators, and officers of the constitutional commissions, and civil servants across the board do not bear any redactions, except in some cases, and only involving the home address of the declarant, as CSC has so allowed.

Says a lawyer from the Office of the Ombudsman: “Redaction gives you no protection at all. It may even trigger suspicion you are hiding something.” The lawyer does not recall any case of an official exposed to security problems on account of the SALNs, even as he cited the value of these documents for pursuing cases of corruption and unexplained wealth.

Redacting SALNs, if deliberate, “may constitute tampering of public documents,” says the Ombudsman lawyer, and if done on orders of higher officials, the latter could be culpable, too. The lawyer notes that the Data Privacy Act has not expressly or explicitly repealed the SALN law, and thus, “repeal by implication or redaction cannot be allowed.”

CSC: SALN law stays

CSC Assistant Commissioner Ariel G. Ronquillo, who heads the Technical Working Group on the SALN Law — composed of representatives of the Office of the President, the Ombudsman, and other SALN repository agencies — says that the CSC guidelines must prevail as the reference in the filing of SALNs.

Interviewed by PCIJ, Ronquillo says that he finds no discrepancy or dissonance between provisions of R.A. No. 6713 (SALN Law) and R.A. No. 10173 (Data Privacy Act).

“I don’t think at this point we have to determine which one will prevail,” Ronquillo says, “because in any instances where there is an apparent inconsistency, just an apparent inconsistency between two laws or between two issuances, the first order of the day is to find a way to reconcile these inconsistencies. In other words, to find that situation where those inconsistencies will not be there. We have to interpret these two laws in a way that they will be harmonized. “

But, he adds, “I have made a brief reading of the law as well as the implementing rules and then I made a review of our own guidelines, and honestly based on my reading, I didn’t see any inconsistency. Yeah, so those two laws can go hand in hand. So when it comes to SALN, I think we have to apply the guidelines on the SALN. When it comes to other matters that are clearly within the coverage of the Data Privacy Act then they can apply those regulations issued by the Privacy Commission. I think that’s how to approach it.”

Under the Data Privacy Act, he notes that an exception of coverage has been specified for “any individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government institution that relates to the functions or position of the individual.”

PDS another matter

Ronquillo makes a distinction, however, between the SALN and personal data sheets or PDS.

“If the matter is purely private to the person whether he is in government or not it may still come under the scope,” Ronquillo says. “For example, personal data sheets (that) are required for any government official or employee upon entry to the government.”

He notes that the PDS “strictly contains personal information” and “before you can access the personal data sheet of a government official or employee, you have to seek the consent of the person.”

But that is not the case with the SALN, says Ronquillo. According to the CSC official, privacy may apply to PDS “but not with respect to the SALN.”

“Our stand with respect to the SALN is that it is an instrument of transparency and therefore it should be available to the public upon request,” he adds.

In Ronquillo’s view, The SALN Law and the CSC should prevail as the reference law and mandated agency in regard to the SALN matters.

CSC has mandate

Says Ronquillo: “Kami yung may mandate under (R.A. No.) 6713 to issue the guidelines. So kapag sinabi naming na available iyan for public scrutiny, they cannot, even if they rule otherwise, they cannot prevail. Dapat kami masusunod. (We have mandate under RA 6713 to issue the guidelines. So when we say that should be available for public scrutiny, even if they rule otherwise, they cannot prevail. Our orders must be followed.)”

By all indications though, the OP Family Clearinghouse might have crossed over to prohibited territory when it redacted multiple data fields in the SALNs of the Cabinet members.

Ronquillo says blackening out the home address of the filer is all that the CSC guidelines allow, nothing more, nothing less. “Yung pag-cross out ng mga material information in the SALN such as the statement of properties as well as the different amounts involved, ‘yun nga ang dapat ipakita (that is what should be disclosed),” he says. “So I don’t think it is covered by the Data Privacy Act because the SALN is an instrument of transparency. If you will not disclose that to the public that will defeat the very purpose why people in government are required to fill out SALNs.”

“Without necessarily ruling on whether the action is correct or not,” Ronquillo says, “our guidelines actually require the statement of the exact place of the property that is reflected in the SALN and that is necessary again for purposes of transparency. If the public looks at any government official’s or employee’s SALN, and the public should also be given information as to where those properties can be found for purposes of verification.”

Transparency is the spirit that should drive the filing of SALNs, he says.

Unwanted effects

“Through the SALN,” according to Ronquillo, “we are actually telling the public I am not hiding anything; I am not enriching myself at the expense of the government. So if you want to inspect my properties, go ahead and inspect. And just to prove to you that everything is legitimately acquired, then go ahead and inspect all those properties wherever they are from. That’s why even those information should be open to the public or whoever requests the SALN of that particular government official or employee.”

Redacting or hiding some data about a filer’s properties may even trigger unwanted results for the filer, he says.

Ronquillo agrees that public officials “should be allowed to protect themselves from harassment and from all other dangers” but also notes that, “there is no assurance that by hiding those information, the protection sought will be achieved. I think that is not the proper way of protecting themselves from harm.”

“That act of hiding those information can even give an impression that they are hiding something from the public that will give the public more reason to do deeper investigation about the accumulation of their wealth and that will generate more interest about them,” he says.

“The moment you hide them, it would really give an impression that you are hiding something and that the acquisition or the accumulation of wealth was not that legitimate that you do not want the public to look at it. So I think that would be contrary first to the principle of transparency and to the very reason why we are executing SALNs.”

PCIJ.1.Tally of Redactions

A good SALN discloses

“In other words,” according to Ronquillo, “a good SALN discloses everything; a good SALN does not hide properties that belong to the filer.”

PCIJ has asked the CSC Commissioners en banc for an official advisory on the guidelines that should apply to the filing of SALNs. In reply, on Sept. 14, 2017, Ronquillo stated: “On the matter of shading or redaction of information in the SALN,” CSC Memorandum Circular No. 2, s. 2013, allows agencies to shade one and only one data: the address of the declarant “for purposes of security.”

The CSC is presently reviewing its policy guidelines on the SALN, he added. “Rest assured that your concerns will be considered, specifically the matter on redaction/shading of information in the SALN when a copy thereof is requested, and on the mater of the effects of the Data Privacy Act of 2012.”

But after three meetings with the PCIJ, the NPC and the OP Family Clearinghouse have agreed to reduce to a minimum the redactions they want to make on the SALNs, notably the declarant’s address, names of children of minor age, government ID number, and signature. When the Palace finally released the SALNs requested by PCIJ last week, parts of the exact location of the filer’s real assets were also redacted.

PCIJ has asked that the redaction process be made transparent, and that a written explanation be issued by the OP Family Clearinghouse stating why and on what basis such redactions would be made.

However, the cover letter for SALNs released to PCIJ this month only briefly explained that the redactions made “pertain to personal information covered by Republic Act No. 10173, otherwise known as the Data Privacy Act of 2012.”

And because additional redactions apart from the filer’s home address would be a clear stretch of what the CSC guidelines allow, PCIJ said that it would be good for the OP Family Clearinghouse to realize that they are by implication repealing or amending the SALN law at whim.

2.1

Some results

The meetings with PCIJ have clarified a few points only. For one, the NPC and the PCOO have now included the CSC and the Ombudsman in the discussions on the redactions being made. The NPC has decided to hold off on issuing the advisory requested by PCOO, until after full consultations with other agencies and stakeholders. Too, the NPC and the PCOO have agreed to call a meeting on Sept. 25 of the SALN repository agencies to align practices in compliance with the law.

Apart from the CSC, the Ombudsman, the Office of the President, the Supreme Court (en banc and Office of the Court Administrator), the Office of the Secretary of the Senate, and the Office of the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives are also SALN repositories or custodian agencies.

In a way, the situation boils down to which should be the greater concern or obligation of public officials: privacy or transparency?

Then again, the expectation of privacy, once one enters public service, seems unwarranted at the very least.

‘Avoiding harassment’

When PCIJ asked Ablan for the first time last August about the redactions, he said: “Informal rules were outlined by the Clearinghouse of the OP family. News reports about the relatives of Secretary Martin Andanar triggered it.”

“We are just looking after our principal,” Ablan said. “Under FOI, there is fear that the information disclosed might lead to harassment and identity theft.”

To see what kind of news reports may have been the cause of concern for Andanar, PCIJ checked out media stories and photos about his relatives. But it found just a few featuring his wife, Alelee Aguilar Andanar, a daughter of Las Pinas Mayor Imelda ‘Mel’ Tobias Aguilar and former Mayor Vergel ‘Nene’ Aguilar.

In any case, Ablan told PCIJ that the Clearinghouse composed of assistant secretaries — who serve as “data privacy officers” but often also as the FOI receiving officers of their agencies — had set “an unwritten rule that it is okay to redact names of children, address, plate number (of vehicles), the signature on and the number of government-issued IDs.”

Privacy, not secrecy?

“We are not trying to hide anything,” Ablan insisted. The concern of committee is we have to protect privacy of our principals.”

“Our unwritten policy also is we will wait for request for reconsideration from requestor, and if needed, we can unredact,” he said. “I hope you understand where we are coming from.”

The MRO chief, lawyer Concepcion Zeny E. Ferrolino-Enad, was, according to Ablan, “willing to disclose but there has to be a middle ground because there could be irresponsible people who will use the info in the SALNs.” Asked if the redactions on the SALNs of the Cabinet members imply special protection for senior officials of the Duterte administration, Ablan replied, “The plan is, even the SALNs of the rank-and-file, we will redact.”

He said that there is “no policy yet from the National Privacy Commission but we have asked for comment. If they tell us we cannot redact, we have to find proper authorities or forum to clarify. I hope you understand our concern is to protect people from harassment.” This much he assured PCIJ: “We can call for an emergency meeting for you with the Clearinghouse.”

PCIJ 3.1.SALN_Tally-Of-Redactions_2

PCIJ.3.What they redacted

Spooked by Privacy Act

PCIJ had also interviewed Liboro prior to the meetings held between PCIJ and the NPC and OP Family Clearinghouse.

PCIJ told Liboro that data privacy officers at the Palace seem to have been spooked by the huge penalties that could be imposed on them for “breach” of the Data Privacy Act, but also seem unaware that they may be violating The SALN Law by redacting or withholding information they are obliged to disclose under transparency and accountability laws.

Liboro sounded reassuring at one point, saying, “The Data Privacy Law does not protect government officials, agencies, contractors or companies. It does not proscribe other laws.”

But, of course, he said there is “a difficult balancing that must be made between data privacy and FOI.”

“Data privacy separates government data,” he said. “Hindi kampi sa gobyerno ito, kaya mahirap gamitin para sa gobyerno (It’s not on the side of the government, so it’s hard to use it for the government).”

It’s a constitutional duty

By contrast, the CSC’s Ronquillo is crystal on the matter: The SALN Law must prevail in regard to the SALN.

Remarks Ronquillo: “This is a constitutional duty so all of us are doing this on a yearly basis and so therefore we also have to be prepared when someone looks at our SALN and someone scrutinizes it. If we are sincere in all our obligations as government people, we should not worry with what is reflected in our SALN. Otherwise, if you do not want that kind of practice, then you have to leave government.”

“You have to leave government,” he repeats. “This is part and parcel of being with government.” — With additional research and reporting by John Reiner Antiquerra and Vino Lucero, PCIJ, September 2017

Impunity acute and benign, fettered flow of information

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PCIJ. FIN State-of-Media_1

THE PRESS in the Philippines has been described to be among the freest in Asia if not in the world, robust, almost rambunctious in its practice. But in the first 16 months of the Duterte administration, its status and practice have been diminished, shaken down by supporters and trolls of the President who would not tolerate critical coverage.

No less than the President has struck at the heart of the institution with threats of action against major news organizations. He has cursed journalists in public for raising testy questions about his health, catcalled a female reporter, and averred without serving proof that journalists are killed because they are corrupt.

This toxic mix — over-reaching executive power, the threat of violence and public censure, and divided and fettered newsrooms — has left the flow of information unfree, convoluted, and constrained under the Duterte presidency.

Today, as the nation marks the 8thanniversary of the massacre of 32 journalists among the 58 victims in Ampatuan, Maguindanao, in 2009, the press would do well to understand the severity of the challenges it faces. While we remain a free community in law and theory, and blessed with a Constitution that enshrines protection, a tectonic shift has moved the ground and the foundation of the practice of journalism under President Rodrigo Duterte.

To be sure, the administration has taken steps early in its rule to address the attacks and threats, and a string of unsolved murders of Filipino journalists from earlier years. Duterte signed Administrative Order No. 1, Creating The Presidential Task Force On Violations Of The Right To Life, Liberty And Security Of The Members Of The Media (PTFoMS), on Oct. 11, 2016. But the agency that is also called PTFoMS lacks resources and personnel to have genuine impact.

In Duterte’s first nine months, the Task Force said that only one journalist had been murdered because of his work — Catanduanes News Now publisher Larry Que — even as it also reported other cases of attacks on the press, including eight shooting Incidents, eight threats, one detention, one request for continued Witness Protection Program coverage, and two cases of physical attack.

On May 2, 2017, a complaint was filed before the Department of Justice against Que’s supposed assailant, PO1 Vincent Tacorda. Tacorda was allegedly instructed by Catanduanes Governor Joseph Cua.

Apart from Que, two more journalists had in fact been felled by unknown guns during the period: radio blocktimer Marlon Muyco of M’lang, Cotabato’s dxND Radyo Bida, who was killed on Feb. 17, 2017; and Remate tabloid columnist Joaquin Briones of Milagros, Masbate, who was killed on March 13, 2017. PTFoMS investigated the cases of Muyco and Briones but did not consider their murders to have been work-related.

The Task Force co-chaired by the secretaries of Justice and the Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO), noted in a report dated May 3, 2017 that there has been “a marked improvement in media security and press freedom in the country after the creation of AO1 and implementation FOI among agencies in the Executive Branch of the government.” Former reporter and PCOO Undersecretary Joel Jose Sy Egco is the Task Force’s executive director.

But it is a story that has turned bad in succeeding months. From May to October this year, the number of casualties among members of the press began to rise again. In the first 16 months of the Duterte presidency:

• Six journalists have been killed, including the three that had been listed by the Task Force;

• Eight have survived slay attempts and received death threats;

• Three libel cases have been filed, even as a libel case filed in 2015 has led to the arrest of the accused. Other libel cases filed in previous years ended in an acquittal and two convictions; and

• Seven major cases of verbal and online threats from local officials or pro-Duterte bloggers have been reported.

In its second and latest report dated Oct. 11, 2017, PTFoMS counted only the case of Sapol News Bulletin columnist Leo Diaz of Sultan Kudarat (who was slain on Aug. 7, 2017 ) as a work-related murder, and not those of four other journalists who were killed during the first 10 months of the Duterte presidency. PTFoMS also tallied three cases of frustrated murder, one attempted homicide, and two cases of threats and physical injuries against a total of six journalists.

PCIJ. State-of-Media_2

A mirror of the society in which it operates, the Philippine press is far from perfect; it replicates the same weaknesses of those it criticizes. History is witness though to its courage in the face of crises of all kinds. In every such instance, there are enough journalists who make the necessary difference, reporting without fear, shining light on wrongdoing in high places, dauntless in the face of conflict, repression, and disaster. Speaking truth to power, Filipino journalists have galvanized the political will of the citizens to unite and stand up to despots or crooks or bullies in power.

Stunned by the challenges that confront the institution today, the media community, in solidarity, now takes stock of what it has lost in terms of press freedom under the Duterte administration.

For one, the flow of official information has been mired in apparent propaganda. Although a Freedom of Information policy has directed all offices in the executive branch to respond to requests for information, far too many exceptions and denied requests have rendered the supposed policy of opennesss a farce.

Official press briefings during milestone events, such as the most recent ASEAN Summit or during the war in Marawi, have been remarkable for their scarcity of substance, and those that are given seem designed to give short shrift to the real need of journalists for relevant information. The President’s communication team is cavalier in throwing around facts out of context, and dishing out partial truths, and even fabricated stories and photographs.

The President’s hostility toward critical reports has not helped. The pens behind them have met with vicious online harassment from bloggers visibly favored by government.

Given the President’s high scores in public-opinion polls, the media have been slow and reluctant to challenge the false claims and flawed political narratives that the President has foisted to justify his over-reach of power. His attacks on political opponents, such as the legal proceedings that landed Senator Leila de Lima in jail, set the bar for how far this government will go to rid itself of critics.

Journalists know also how it is to be afraid, not just for oneself but also for one’s families and friends. Rabid cyber-bashing from Duterte followers have cowed many in the media. Painting critics as invariably partisan and “yellow” has significantly restrained media investigation and inquiry. The President’s expressed animosity toward some journalists has served to put the media on notice.

Unfortunately, many newsrooms have yet to respond with appropriate, timely, and relevant measures to assure the safety and wellbeing of journalists and coverage teams assigned to cover danger-fraught assignments such as the war on drugs or the siege of Marawi, or even to deal directly with the attacks on their ranks.

The weaknesses in journalism practice exacerbate the situation. Overall, media seemed only too willing to go along with what the President and other public officials say, recording their statements without questioning the veracity or credibility of their claims. In the last 16 months, for instance, reportage on the drug war, Marawi, corruption, and many other public-policy issues has been driven largely by the government’s lead on these stories.

Media reports have typically simply quoted or aired everything that the President and his officials have said about the necessity of the use of violence in the war on drugs. Repeated claims that there are supposedly four million alleged drug addicts have passed without vigorous challenge. The manipulation of the numbers in police records and the failure of the police to report their findings on the so-called DUIs or death (later called murder, and later still, homicide) cases under investigation have come and gone with little scrutiny by the press.

By the monitoring reports of the Center for Media Freedom & Responsibility (CMFR), the secretariat of the Freedom Fund for Filipino Journalists (FFFJ), the acute assaults on media freedom and journalists have continued under Duterte’s watch. These include:

KILLINGS:

Aside from Que, Muyco, Briones, and Diaz, two more journalists had been killed:

• Volunteer broadcaster Rudy Alicaway of Zamboanga del Sur’s dxPB 106.9 FM radio, who was killed on Aug. 6, 2017; and

• Radio broadcaster Christopher Iban Lozada of Surigao del Sur’s dxBF Prime Broadcasting Network, who was shot dead on Oct. 24, 2017.

Of the six cases, CMFR considers the cases of Que, Briones, Diaz, and Lozada as work-related.

PTFoMS, for its part, has classified the cases of Que and Diaz, and more recently Lozada as work-related.

Only in the case of Que has the alleged assailant been identified while the other cases remain under investigation.

SLAY ATTEMPTS, ASSAULTS:

• Slay attempt on radio reporter Saturnino “Jan” Estanio of Surigao City’s DxRS-Radio Mindanao Network on June 30, 2016, by two men on a motorcycle. Estanio and his 12-year-old son were wounded in the incident.

• Slay attempt on blocktimer Apolinario Suan Jr. of Bislig City, Surigao del Sur’s Real FM radio, on July 14, 2016, by unidentified men who fired at his vehicle;

• Slay attempt on Virgilio Maganes, 58, radio broadcaster of dwPR in Dagupan City who was attacked by assailants while he was on his way to his radio program, morning of November 8, 2016.

• Assault on correspondents Reuben James Rosalado and Jovito Alcoran of ABS-CBN Zamboanga TV on Sept. 22, 2016;

• Slay attempt on radio commentator Julito “Paka-paka” Orillaneda of Marihatag town, Surigao del Sur’s DxJB FM on July 26, 2017;

• Slay attempt on columnist Crisenciano “Cris” Ibon of Batangas City’s Police Files Tonite on Aug. 9, 2017; and

• Slay attempt on broadcaster Carlos Sasis of Legazpi City, Albay’s Zagitsit News FM radio on Aug. 24, 2017.

DEATH THREATS:

• Death threats via sms received by radio reporter Norman Mendoza of Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, on Sept. 7, 2016;

• SMS threats received by Lourdes Escaros of the dzXL RMN on November 6 and 16, 2016.

• Death threat received by reporter Jaime Aquino of The Manila Times newspaper on Nov. 23, 2016. Aquino is also facing libel charges.

HARASSMENT, ONLINE ATTACKS:

Apart from these journalists enduring direct assaults or facing death threats, there were also cases of journalists receiving verbal threats, harassed during coverage events, or assaulted online under the Duterte administration. These include:

• On July 29, 2016, the website of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism was hacked;

• On Sept. 20, 2016, Gretchen Malalad and Jamela Alindogan-Caudron of ABS-CBN were targeted by criticisms, insults, and threats by pro-Duterte bloggers. NUJP, in a statement of support for Malalad and Caudron, urged journalists to report and document any attacks and threats and call the attention of appropriate law enforcement bodies;

• On Oct. 3, 2016, pro-Duterte bloggers harassed Reuters reporters Karen Lema and Manuel Mogato via memes as “the real culprits behind the fuss” over Mr. Duterte’s controversial remarks that drew parallels between Adolf Hitler’s killing of Jews and the bloody war on drugs. The posts accused Lema and Mogato of “deliberately misreporting” Duterte’s remarks, adding that “malicious and irresponsible journalists are the true enemies of democracy (and)… should be punished with the full force of the law.”

• On Nov. 24, 2016,President Rodrigo Duterte “cussed out” Jonathan Miller, Asia correspondent of Channel 4 of the United Kingdom when the latter asked him about killings related to the war on drugs;

• On Dec. 8, 2016, the Facebook page of journalist Manny Mogato of Reuters Online was hacked. His cover photo was changed into the cover photo used by pro-Duterte Facebook page “Duterte is my President”;

• On Jan. 9, 2017, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP) suffered a denial of service attack on its website, www.nujp.org. Prior to the attack, NUJP had released a statement against President Duterte’s declaration that he was ‘playing’ with the media. Duterte said in a CNN Philippines interview on 29 December 2016, “Nilalaro ko kayo. Mahilig talaga ako (sa) gan’un. Alam ng team ninyo mahilig ako magbitaw ng kalokohan.” The NUJP statement was flooded with hate comments from Duterte supporters.

• On Feb. 7, 2017, reporters Aya Yupangco (dwIZ), Dennis Datu (dzMM), and Michael Goyagoy (dzXL) were harassed by the Presidential Security detail during a coverage event in Manila;

• On April 7, 2017, then Environment and Natural Resources secretary Gina Lopez told reporter Janina Lim of BusinessWorld that “you are just a fucking employee.” She also accused reporters of being “bought,” in response to questions Lim had raised. Lopez later released a public apology for the incident.

• On April 22, 2017, verbal threats on reporter Jayson Drew of Pilipino Mirror were made by a Las Pinas City councilor;

• On Sept. 21, 2017, pro-Duterte bloggers launched an online attack on reporter Jam Sisante of GMA7; and

• On Nov. 3, 2017, RJ Nieto, known as blogger Thinking Pinoy, allegedly incited violence against Rappler reporter Pia Ranada during his radio program. Nieto urged his guest Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque to throw a hollow block at Ranada, after the latter commented that in response to journalists hurling criticisms against the government, he would throw hollow blocks at journalists. Ranada has filed a complaint against Nieto with the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas. Later, Roque in a tweet said, “”To my DDS friends: we will not throw anything at legit journos. Let’s give them hot pan de sal instead. Pls leave Pia Ranada alone! Thx.”

LIBEL SUITS:

Cases of libel — which remains a criminal offense in the Philippines — have been dismissed or filed against journalists in the last 20 months under Duterte. These include:

• On Aug. 22, 2016, a Makati City court ruled in favor of a libel suit filed against the Philippine Daily Inquirer by former Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile;

• In June 2016, a regional trial court in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental acquitted dyMD Energy FM anchor Cornelio Pepino, known as Rex Cornelio, of two counts of libel filed by Negros Oriental Governor Roel Degamo.

• In August 2016, Quezon Province Governor David “Jayjay” Suarez filed libel charges against three journalists critical of his administration — Senior News Correspondent of the Journal Group of Publications Gemi Formaran, Ang Diaryo Natin publisher Johnny Glorioso, and dzEL Radyo Agila anchor Rico Catampungan. On August 15, a Lucena City regional trial court served all three a total of 3,000-page subpoena for libel.

OTHER CASES:

These acute and direct attempts to harass and muzzle journalists and media freedom have unfolded alongside more benign but equally grave threats to the practice of journalism and the free flow of information in the Philippines today. For instance:

Access to information remains problematic for journalists and media agencies covering the war on drugs. Getting information, especially on sensitive and controversial cases, remains constrained.

• Officials and units of the Philippine National Police Police have repeatedly denied requests for spot reports, supposedly on account of the difficulty to copy or reproduce volumes of reports.

• PNP chiefs or officers-in-charge have mostly refused to grant interviews about the relevant details of operations conducted against illegal drugs, especially if these details contradict the accounts of the family members of alleged suspects.

A freelance journalist requested copies of spot reports on the cases of those killed during police operations in an entire month. The request was repeatedly denied even as senior police officials had acknowledged that police spot reports are public documents.

Supt. Rolando Gonzales, Pandacan Police Station chief, has repeatedly denied requests for interviews about police operations his unit has conducted, even when sought for comments at the crime scene. He does not respond to questions even in face-to-face encounters with reporters.

On Sept. 13, 2017, the PNP, through its spokesperson Supt. Dionardo Carlos, said that spot reports will not be released to reporters unless the “head of office, his duly [designated] representative, his PIO (public information officer) or his spokesperson” determine that such release will not affect an investigation. He said that the directive restricting journalists from obtaining spot reports was issued as early as Feb. 18, 2014.

Instead of the police being the sole official source of reports on the drug war, a highly unusual and irregular situation has happened. Employees of some funeral parlors have also become the tipsters of journalists on where and when a “Tokhang” operation would occur. In one instance, a reporter got a call from a funeral parlor employee, who said that something was going to happen at around 2 a.m. the next day under the Jones Bridge in Manila. At the appointed hour the next day, reporters discovered the body of a supposed Tokhang victim at the exact same place.

Against their will, media personnel are sometimes compelled by police officers to sign on as witnesses in police anti-drug operations, supposedly as mandated by the law. Media team members are asked to sign on to the police’s inventory reports on the items that had been seized during police operations, in the form and manner that the police had prepared these. This practice exposes media personnel to serious legal implications and real conflict of interest.

In one case, Janelyn and Carmelo Rima, publishers of the community newspaper Island Sandigan, were charged with libel after publishing a story on a drug raid, which they covered and for which officials of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had asked them earlier to sign on as witnesses.

Newsroom protection for the safety of journalists covering the war on drugs remains lacking. Most newsroom managers seem to consider the coverage of the war on drugs as just a typical police beat assignment. Only a few newsrooms have provided appropriate protective gear or offered hostile-environment training for their reporters and coverage teams.

Yet the risks to which journalists covering the drug war are far too real and can come from a variety of fronts. For instance, the safety of a group of journalists covering an anti-illegal drugs operation in Manila was compromised after a family member of the ‘Tokhang’ victim turned hysterical after finding out that his brother was killed after allegedly fighting back. The knife-wielding family member went distraught while the media teams tarried inside the compound without realizing that police had already left the area.

Psychological trauma overwhelms media coverage teams assigned to the war on drugs on account of their repeated first-hand exposure to revolting images of the dead, the maimed, the enraged, as well as the tremendous grief of the family members of the victims. A number of reporters and photojournalists have reported experiencing intrusive nightmares. Still a few others have reported feeling paranoid about seeing motorcycle men riding in tandem. Too, there are those who have reported feeling desensitized to or unmoved by images of blood and gore. — CMFR, NUJP, PCIJ, 23 November 2017

No PH law vs. offshore accounts, issue splits finance execs, then, now

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Paradise-Papers-FB-ICIJ

WHAT DO some bankers and fund managers, a few senior government officials, a dozen top taxpayers, and a handful of companies located in the country have in common?

They are among some 200 Filipinos, Philippine residents, and corporations that own or are linked to offshore accounts in tax havens across the world, according to the “Paradise Papers” cache of 13.4 million confidential electronic documents that had been leaked and exposed this month.

While having offshore accounts is not a wrongdoing per se, in some cases, these may be used to avoid or evade tax payments in their host countries, hide unexplained wealth, or move illicit and fraudulent financial flows across borders.

The latest expose by “Paradise Papers,” which has led to stories by media outfits such as the BBC and the U.K. newspaper The Guardian, covers offshore investments made by the law firm Appleby and corporate service providers Estera and Asiaciti Trust in 19 tax jurisdictions in the world. About 120,000 people and companies are enrolled in “Paradise Papers,” including Philippine citizens, residents, and business entities.

The “Paradise Papers” data files were leaked to the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung, which shared these with the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) based in Washington, D.C., and its global reporting network of over 380 journalists from 100 news organizations, including PCIJ.

PCIJ reviewed the list with special attention to apparent transparency and accountability issues. PCIJ thus sent inquiry letters to about a dozen individuals who had served as senior state officials, donated to candidates for president, own or run major corporate entities, or are tied to contracts with government.

Not all the Philippine accounts are active as of the current year. Most accounts are listed to be operational still while some turned out to have been dissolved already, according to those PCIJ reached for comment.

(For the full list of persons and companies, check out ICIJ’s Paradise Papers database.)

This is the second round of PCIJ reporting on offshore accounts with ICIJ. In 2013, PCIJ wrote about the offshore ties of then re-electionist Ilocos Norte Gov. Maria Imelda ‘Imee’ Marcos, then senator Manuel ‘Manny’ B. Villar Jr., and then senatorial candidate Jose Victor ‘JV’ Ejercito. They all failed to disclose their interests offshore in their Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth.

Not for bad reasons?

Five of those PCIJ sought for comment, as well as replies from the law and accountancy firms that had assisted them, invariably disowned or denied any wrongdoing had been committed in regard to their offshore accounts.

But Filipino and Philippine-based offshore account holders may have nothing to worry about for now. At present, the Philippines has neither law nor rules, nor any effective regulatory framework for monitoring or even recovering taxes possibly due from monies in these accounts.

Too, between former and current finance officials, there is a split opinion on what the Philippine government should do to regulate such accounts and to run after their owners.

Interviewed recently by PCIJ, former Internal Revenue Commissioner Kim Jacinto-Henares said that in her view, when someone or some entity opens an offshore account, that should raise concern at once among government officials. In contrast, Finance Secretary Carlos G. Dominguez — who admits his connection to an offshore account himself until 2001 – told PCIJ that “there is nothing illegal per se about these accounts… and we are not about to declare them illegal.”

“Actually,” Henares said, “nobody can stop you from incorporating anywhere in the world.” But, she said, “the question is if that company has an asset that matches (its) net worth.”

She pointed out, “The important thing to ask is if the tax for that had been paid, and second, did it come from questionable deals. Kasi ‘yung galing sa masama rin, hindi mo rin binabayaran ‘yung buwis (Because if it came from something illegal, you wouldn’t pay the tax due).”

Why hide monies?

Henares continued: “Ibig sabihin, hindi mo siya maipasok mainly sa pangalan mo kasi hindi mo ma-explain saan nanggaling ‘yung income, saan galing ‘yung pera. ‘Yun lang naman ‘yung tinatanong d’yan, pero itself, wala namang problema (In other words, you couldn’t place it under your name because you won’t be able to explain where the income was sourced, where the money came from. That’s really the only question there, but itself, there’s no problem).”

It’s a question, according to her, of what would drive someone or some entity to open an offshore account. “Siyempre, medyo may tanong lang na ano bang objective mo (Of course, there’s a bit of a question there on what really your objective is),” Henares said. “Parang lahat ng tao feeling nila na kapag Pilipino ka, naiisahan mo ‘yung gobyerno mo. Bakit mo ginagawa ‘yan? (So everyone starts feeling like, if you’re a Filipino, you can easily put one over your government. Why do you do that?)”

‘No law, not illegal’

Dominguez takes the contrary view. Indeed, he said that there is no clear, cogent legal framework to regulate offshore accounts, but getting one “would require legislation by Congress.” At the moment, he said, “we’re all focused on the tax reform bill until December.”

“But really,” Dominguez said, “there is nothing illegal per se about Filipinos or Philippine residents opening accounts overseas.” Still, he said that “when information like this comes out, then we look at it case by case.”

“In truth, there is nothing illegal about it,” Dominguez said. “It is legal, and we are not about to declare it illegal.” He then cited one instance when he was told that a friend of his staff had planned to open a dollar account in Hong Kong to buy bitcoins. Recalled Dominguez: “I told her, ‘Go ahead, that’s okay’.”

These comments by the Finance Secretary came on the fourth time that PCIJ had called him in the last month, to follow up on a request letter for an official opinion on offshore accounts from his department.

PCIJ mailed its letter to Dominguez last November 8, prompting a quick call from him; at the time, though, he was still in Vietnam for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit.

He promised then that he would organize a technical working group of his staff, as well as officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and — if they would agree, he said — of the Bangko Sentral and the Anti-Money Laundering Council.

The ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Summit intervened and kept Dominguez busy for a week. He received PCIJ’s second and third calls during the week, however.

A lesser problem?

Last Nov. 16, he said, “My staff will write you a letter. We discussed this yesterday. There is no law prohibiting anyone from opening offshore accounts. It’s allowed by law.” Offshore accounts “may be a tax leak for us,” Dominguez said, “but it is a small leak.”

He added that offshore accounts are a lesser problem than tax incentives that some companies and sectors have been enjoying for so long. “We have a list of tax incentives given, and you’d be surprised how big those amounts are,” Dominguez said. “Some have been receiving tax benefits for over 40 years.”

Tax leakage on account of incentives given to corporations is, in Dominguez’s view, “a more important issue than someone buying, registering a plane or cargo vessel — that is a one-off thing.”

In an offshore leaks database reported in 2013, Dominguez’s name had actually come up as an offshore account holder. The company listed in his name was called Radstock Corp.

When PCIJ asked Dominguez about this, he promptly acknowledged his connection with Radstock. “I saw that before,” he said. “I was involved with them a long time ago, 2001 ‘ata.” As he recalled it, his engagement as a director of Radstock was connected with a project of the Philippine National Construction Corporation.

Like Dominguez, many other finance experts say that offshore accounts are legal. They also note that these are rather common among multinational enterprises with global operations. Yet when account holders turn to tax havens offshore to avoid or evade paying taxes, hide illicit wealth, and conduct illegitimate or abusive financial flows in secret, they cross over to forbidden territory in law.

Evade, avoid taxes

International companies, finance experts say, operate in tax havens to be able to transfer the taxable income to jurisdictions where tax rates are lower. Companies that make profits in the Philippines, for instance, can transfer these to other jurisdictions. This means that what should have been part of the tax base of the Philippines becomes instead part of that of another country.

Tax havens also use secrecy as a prime tool to hide identities. Individuals and entities can hold shares in offshore companies without being identified, unlike in the Philippines where incorporation and registration records are public. Too, one can sell shares offshore without having to pay capital-gains tax.

Secrecy jurisdictions provide structures that enable people or entities to skirt or undermine laws of their home country or jurisdictions elsewhere. In the Philippines, the lack of a legal and regulatory regime over offshore accounts makes it difficult for government to run after tax evaders and money launderers.

According to the Tax Justice Network, between $21 trillion and $32 trillion of private financial wealth is located, untaxed or lightly taxed, in tax havens around the world. Illicit cross-border financial flows have also been pegged at $1 trillion to $1.6 trillion per year, a huge amount compared to the $142.6 billion in global foreign aid in 2016.

Founded in 2003, Tax Justice Network or TJN is a U.K.-based independent international network that conducts research, analysis, and advocacy on international tax, the international aspects of financial regulation, the impact of tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax “competition,” and tax havens. Not aligned with any political party, TJN has global and regional partners in Africa, Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and North America.

TJN has a Financial Secrecy Index that ranks jurisdictions according to their secrecy and the scale of their offshore financial activities. The higher the rank, the more secretive financial activities are in the country. The scoring is based on an assessment of 15 secrecy indicators that can be grouped around four broad dimensions of secrecy: knowledge of beneficial ownership, corporate transparency, efficiency of tax and financial regulation, and international standards and cooperation.

Of the 92 countries surveyed by TJN for its 2015 Index, Bermuda was ranked No. 34 and Isle of Man at No. 32. The Philippines was 46th. Switzerland, Hong Kong, and the United States are first, second, and third, respectively.

The Financial Secrecy Index reveals that the stereotypes of tax havens are misconceived. Said TJN: “The world’s most important providers of financial secrecy harbouring looted assets are mostly not small, palm-fringed islands as many suppose, but some of the world’s biggest and wealthiest.”

Wanted: Evidence

As of this posting, PCIJ has yet to receive a written reply from Dominguez himself, or even from the “technical working group” that he said he plans to convene to study the matter of offshore accounts. He tossed PCIJ’s query letter to Finance Undersecretary Antonette C. Tionko, who recently replied to PCIJ. She said in part that they had “gone through the attached list which contains names of Filipinos and a few foreign corporations which appear to have Philippine ownership (although this is not clear considering that only the name of said corporations are provided).”

“Please note,” Tionko said in her letter dated Nov. 22, “that under Philippine tax laws, income of Filipino citizens are subject to Philippine income tax regardless of where earned. On the other hand, only income of foreign corporations from Philippine sources is subject to Philippine income tax. Hence, if we assume that the listed corporations are all foreign corporations, evidence must be presented… that income is earned and not reported in the Philippines to constitute a violation of the Tax Code.”

She then asked for “further information” on the Filipinos on the Paradise Papers list. According to Tionko, information “such as purported types of investments, amounts of said investments, and the like will be relevant in determining whether or not there is a violation of Philippine laws.”

Global vs local firms

To Henares, meanwhile, big companies and top taxpayers who have offshore ties are not suspect. She is more concerned, she said, about those on the list who have no global business or reason to have offshore companies. Asked Henares: “If you have no international corporation, then what are you doing there?”

Henares said that she welcomes having more information into offshore transactions primarily because without information and appropriate regulations, governments have no way of running after tax evaders who hide their wealth offshore.

The BIR, with Henares at the helm, had set to investigate Filipinos with offshore accounts following PCIJ’s 2013 report. But Henares said she could not recall updates on the planned investigation.

When contacted by PCIJ on the matter, BIR Assistant Commissioner Marissa Cabreros said that the Bureau cannot confirm or deny any information about it because its staff are bound by law to keep silent.

In any case, Henares said that the country’s strict bank secrecy law in a way already offers “a domestic haven” for people who may want to hide their cash assets. Tax havens offshore meanwhile offer options for people who may want to hide their ownership of properties.

“Let’s say,” she said, “without knowing how much they have in the bank, we already know they’re deficient by P1 million. What more if we have that bank figure? It would be much, much more ‘di ba? Then what more if we have the information about the international (accounts)? Then it could become much, much more din.”

Information exchange

The OECD Global Forum for Tax Transparency was specifically set up to address the risks to tax compliance posed by secrecy jurisdictions. Global Forum members, among them the Philippines, had agreed to implement transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes. This includes the Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR) and the Automatic Exchange of Financial Account Information (AEOI), which requires tax administrations to exchange taxpayers’ financial information.

Henares clarified, however, that the Philippines is involved only in the EOIR, which allows the BIR to exchange information only with a country that the Philippines has a tax treaty with.

The Philippines was reviewed as “largely compliant” in the first round of the EOIR review. But it currently has treaties with 41 countries only; it has no tax treaty with many of the popular tax havens.

The OECD and the Council of Europe also developed the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, which is said to be the “most comprehensive multilateral instrument available for all forms of tax co-operation to tackle tax evasion and avoidance.” The convention not only provides for exchange of information, but also includes assistance in recovery, the service of documents, and facilitation of joint audits.

The Philippines signed onto the agreement in 2014 but has yet to ratify it. — PCIJ, November 2017

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